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ANTICIPATORY REMEDIES FOR TAKINGS 
Thomas W MerriIJ 
Tiro Supreme Court bas rendered /uv Ii"e~ of deci~'jofls «hom (be Jemt.vlies {«'ai/Hble (or 
a yiolmion of Ille Takings Claus,), One Iinc huMs I/Jal cow1$ hm'C 1m aulhorily /0 CIJIer 
aIJIiojm/ory (Je.cn~es ill !.1 /(11185 UI.<;{,S jf Ihe daimaIJI can oblain compensation elsewhere. 
TlIe or/JeT" lillf!. wbich iI/eludes IIllre of (he Court's mos/ recellf wkings C.l5eS, resulls il! Ille 
emf)' of an allficipafOry decree aoom laki1lgs liabiliry. This Essay argues Ibar (he second 
/int! is rhe correC/ 0111'. Courls should be allowed 10 emer rk'Claril/ury or mller alllicipi"ory 
judgmcm.~ aboul ml<illg.~ liability. as long as limy respect Ihe limil(v/ nature of Ibc right 
cre.lfed by (he Takings Clause and do no/ usurp (he limiled waivers of sovereign imll/unify 
for aCliolls 10 recover compensation (roll! (he goremmeJ!{. AmicipalOlY IiligilfiotJ should IJOI 
be romine. In ordinal)' condemnalion cases and ill mOSI reg!ilalOl)' lakings cases Ihar fUn! 
Of! Ihe INmicu/ar fact~ preM!med, Ihe action l;ef!kif!g compef!Sil/ion s/lOu/d provide comp/ele 
and ,1dcqunle relici But where 11'lIJillin8 /If'Opl>l1y Owllelli 10 all aCllon for cOJIIIJClI.<;'-1tiof) will 
resu/I ill all incomplele, impmClical. or Illeffldelll outcome, mJllcip.lrolY relief alJoul wlJelher 
a takiJlg lias occurred Is appropri.1fe mKi should be permissible. 71,e Essay argues Ihal 
recognizing the appropriale role for amicipafOlY remedies wider the Takings Clause amild 
help reduce Ihe llIally pilfalls of !iligatillg takillg~ cia im!.', fwd provide more COllsislem fwd 
effiV:Ii<'e enforcement of Ihis con~lltution.-l1 rigllt. 
IniODUC'IO~ 
litigating takings claims under the U.S. Constitution involves pitfalls 
not encountered in ordinary constitutional litigation. With respect to 
takings claims against the federal government , just compensation can 
ordinarily be awarded only by the Court of Federal Claims (CFC) . an 
"Articl e I" court located in Washington , D.C. The CFC, however. has no 
authority to grant equitable or declaratory relief. Consequently, claimants 
who wish to advance claims enforced by iruunctions or declaratory 
judgments (for example. that the government action was arbitrary and 
capricious) must seek relief in an Article III court. This means claimants 
must often sp lit their claims between two courts, giving rise to tricky 
questions of timing and preclusion. If they file in the wrong court , or get 
the sequencing wrong, consideration of the takings claim may be 
foreclosed. Congress could clean up the mess by rewriting the relevant 
• • harles Evans Hughes Professor. Columbia Law School. I have benefi ted from advice from John 
Echeverria. Michael McConnell . Henry Monaghan, and JUSlin l'ido1. and fmm feedback at symposia at 
New York University and William and Mary Law Schools where I prescnled e~rlier versions of this 
Es .... ay. 
I .'iCc I"fm I). 1640. 
2 United States v. King. 395 U.s. I. 2- 5 (1969). There are narrow exceptions which are 
immalC rial here. See 28 U.s.c. § 149I(a)(2). (b)(2) (2012) {granting limiwd equitable authority to the 
CFe in Federal employment and competitive bidding llispules}. 
3 See infra note 157. 
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jurisdictional statutes, but has failed to act.-
With respect to federal takings claims against slate and local 
governments. the Supreme Court has held thaI such claims must be 
initially presented to state courts before they can be heard in federal court. 
Any legal and factual issues that are resolved by the slate courts, however, 
cannot be relitigated in a subsequent challenge in federal courl. ' Since 
federal and state takings clauses are generally interpreted the same way. 
this gives rise to what has been aptly called a "trap." Allhough federal 
constitutional claims ordinarily can be tried in federal court under 42 
USc. § 1983,' takings claims, because they must be initially presented to 
state courts, are generally barred from being considered by any fede ral 
court other than the U.S. Supreme Court on certiorari from the final state 
court decision, which is rarely granted. 
This Essay argues that these pitfalls of litigating federal takings claims 
rest, in significant part , on an erroneous understanding about the scope of 
federal judicial authority under the Takings Clause. Starting from the 
premises that the Consti tution does not prohibit takings but only requires 
that they be compensated" and that compensation can be awarded only in a 
court in which the government has waived its sovereign immunity, the 
Supreme Court has concluded - sometimes - that federal courts of 
general jurisdiction have no authority to conSider takings claims as long as 
an action for compensation is available elsewhere. On other occasions 
however - and usually without acknowledging the inconsistency - the 
Court has reviewed takings claims without requiring that they first be 
submitted to the court having authority to award just compensation . The 
latter line of authority, although poorly theorized by the Court, is the 
correct one. There is no rule of law that prevents federa l courts of general 
jurisdiction from adjudicating claims that arise under the Takings Clause 
- as long as they confine themselves to the question whether there has 
been a taking that entitles the owner to compensation. Given sovereign 
immunity, however, any actual award of compensation against the federa l 
government or one of the states (as opposed to a local government) must 
be made by a court having jurisdiction to render such ajudgment. 
4 TIIC approprialely lilled Tucker ACI Shumc Relief ACI of 1997. H.R. 992. 1051h Congo (1997). 
faileddueto~ScIl~tefl1iblL~ter. SmGi ll l l1 C.SlIJ ,U II I III I I IITI I I I F l l Illl GliE I I~! 1 1 
439- 40 (2000) . 
5 Williamson CIlIy. Reg ' ll'lalining Cornrn'n V. Hamilton Bank. 473 U.S, 172.191- 95 (1985). 
6 See Sail Relllo 1·lold L P. v. CiIY of San FrarlCiSCO. 545 U.s. 323 (2005) (inlerpreling 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1738 10 preclude liligalioll ill federal courl of issuCS of law and faci delemlilled ill Slale I~kings cases 
mandared hy WjJJjamwll COUIJIyJ. 
7 Madeline J. Meacham. The Williamson Tmp. 32 Ul l U 1 .239 (2000). 
II '1l1e Coun has held Ihal exhaustion of state remedies is nOI required as a prerequisite to filing a 
§ 1983 aClioll, Palsy v. Rd. of Regell is. 457 U.s. 496. ~ 1 6 (1982). COllscquenlly. Williamson CO(JIJ/Y 
j usrifies it~ rule tl~11 takings cL1illlS mUSI be in !ti~lly presenTed (0 a srare court as a "ripe ness" 
requiremen t. .~')C WilJjafll~on CIJIy .. 473 U.S. ar 194. ~lIhough func tionally whar ir requires i~ e)(halL~lion 
of STale remedies in takings cases . 
9 See First English Evan~,'eIiCilI Lur/leran Churc h of Glendale v, Cnly. of Los Angeles. 182 U.s. 
304.315 (1987). 
10 See infnl nore 71 and acco1l11Mnying rext. 
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The vehicle for allowing federal courts to consider takings claims, even 
if they have no authority to award j ust compensation, is what I call an 
anticipatory remedy. The primary type of remedy I have in mind is a 
declaratory judgment, authorized by the Declaratory Judgment Act of 
1934. , In appropriate circumstances, federal courts of general j urisdiction 
should be able to entertain claims that a federal or state government unit is 
proposing to engage in action that would constitute a taking, and if so, to 
issue a declaration that compensation would be required if the government 
persists. Anticipatory remedies could also take other forms beSides 
declaratory j udgments. A petition for review of federal agency action 
under the agency's authorizing statute or the Administrative Procedure 
Act (APA) could provide the basis for such a determination. The 
Supreme Court' s discretionary authority to grant certiorari to review 
federal questions that arise in federal or state courts can - and often does 
- function as a form of anticipatory relief. In rare circumstances, federal 
courts should be allowed to enjoin federa l or state government action 
under the Takings Clause. ' 
The understanding that federal courts have authority to enter 
anticipatory relief under the Takings Clause does not mean that most or 
even very many takings cases should be deCided by federal courts of 
general jurisdiction. Anticipatory relief is discretionary, and should be 
allowed only if a claimant can show that important private or 
governmental interests would be served by allowing such relief. Because 
the substantive right created by the Takings Clause is only a right of 
compensation, such a showing, in the ordinary case, will be foreclosed , 
because the right will be vindicated in due course by an award of 
compensation. In appropriate circumstances, however - such as where 
litigation in the court having j urisdiction to award compensation would be 
futile, or where anticipatory resolution would resolve significant 
uncertainty affec ting the use of property, or where such relief is critical to 
allowing an important governmental function to proceed without running 
the risk of extensive government liability - a claimant should be able to 
secure anticipatory relief in federal courts of general jurisdiction. This 
understanding is already reflected in one line of Supreme Court authority, 
II I have borrowed this useful term from William M. Landes & I~ichard A. Posner. n!e Economics 
of AmiciparOlY Adjudicariol!. 231. LE , I j Sl l I . 61!3 (1994). 
12 28 U.s.c. §§ 2201- 2202 (2012). 
13 Pub. L. No. 79-404. 60 Stat 237 (1946) (cO<.1ifk-.J as 3mcrlded in scaltcrW sections of 5 USC). 
14 TIle prln~1ry circumstances where injunctive rather than declaratory relief would he appropriate 
would be when the government seeks to condemn property for something other than a public usc. see 
Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff. 167 U.S. 229. 24 1 (191!4) (noting injunction was proper relief for takillg 
without public use). or when it lacks legislativc authority to take private I)luperty. see YoungstO\o\"Il 
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer. 343 U.s. 579. 584- 85 (1952) (Injunction proper when property has heen 
-unlawfully taken"). htiuncHve relief would also he appropriate if tile government takes property hut 
has provided 00 means of securing just compensation. See J05hua D. Hawley. nil: lkginllill8 of rile 
End? Honle v. Department of Agriculture and rile Furure ofWil!ialilson County. 2012- 2013 Cl) 0 So ~ . 
Cr. R, \ . 245. 256 & n.58 (collec ting cases enj oin ing takings whe n:: the govcmmcnl has ]lTovi(!l-.J 
lncomplele or no compeJl~ation). 
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and indeed is embedded in three of the Court's most recent takings 
decisions. h awaits only being adequately rationalized. 
If this understanding of the Takings Clause is correct, it is a nontrivial 
conclusion. It means the Supreme Coun's precedem requiring that all 
federal takings claims be channeled through the CFe should be 
significantly qualified, and its requirement that takings claims against Slate 
and local government units must always be initially presented to a state 
court should be overruled .. , Since both doctrines are major barriers to 
federal court adjudication of takings claims, this change in the 
understanding of permissible remedies for takings would go some distance 
toward reducing the unnecessary delays and other pitfalls that currently 
stand in the way of litigating takings claims in Article 1Il courts. In so 
doing, it would help blunt former Chief Justice Rehnquist's complaint that 
the Takings Clause stands as a lowly "poor relation~ compared to its 
revered cousins in the Bill of Rights. 
The Essay is organized as follows . The first three Parts seek to 
untangle the inlricate doctrinal web that has led the Supreme Court, in 
some cases, to assert that takings claimants are limited to filing claims for 
compens ation in courts deSignated for that purpose. I contend that the 
arguments in support of this conclusion are flawed , and that there is 
nothing in the Constitution that prohibits anticipatory litigation over 
whether a taking that would entitle a property owner to compensation has 
occurred or is being threatened . Part IV turns to the question whether 
anticipatory remedies are deSirable, and considers a number of 
circumstances reflected in recent decisions and controversies suggesting that 
such remedies would be highly useful, at least in select circumstances. Part 
V offers some general thoughts about how judicial discretion to provide 
anticipatory remedies for takings should be structured. 
1. Tw o L1 ~ ES 01 A U1 HOill Y 
The law governing remedies available for takings of property is vexed 
in large part because of the inconsistent behavior of the U.S. Su preme 
Court. The Court has. in fact. promulgated two separate lines of au thority 
about takings remedi es, which I will call the A line and the B line. 
In the A line, the Court refuses to adjudicate a takings claim unless the 
claimant has pursued a claim for compensation in the designated court for 
securing such relief {hereinafter the compensation court}. ' With respect to 
a lleged takings by the federa l government , the A line is reflected in the 
"Tucker Act doctrine, ~ which says that a federal court of general 
15 Overruling lh is fClluiremenl was urged. wilhoul a clear lheory For doing so. by rour JUSlices in 
Sal! R')l!1O HOlel. LP. Y. City of Sal! Francisco. 545 U.S. 323. 348- 52 (2005) (Rehnqlli~l . CJ .. 
concurring irllhejmlgment). 
16 Dolan v. City oFTigard. 512 U.S. 374. 392 (1994). 
17 A rew Slales. such as Wisconsin. use condemn3lion connnissions 10 determine compensation. 
St. ... Wrs . S1 I 1 . A~' . § 32.08 (Wes l 2006) . The lenn 'compensation court" should be urll.krslood 10 
encompass such ~dmjni~Il"iHlve txx:Iies as well a.~ courts. 
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j urisdiction will not adj udicate a takings claim as long as Congress has not 
withdrawn the jurisdiction conferred by the Tucker Act · to consider such 
claims. ' With respect to alleged takings by state and local governments, 
the A line is reflected in the" WjJJiamson County doctrine," which says that 
"if a State provides an adequate procedure for seeking j ust compensation, 
the property owner cannot claim a vio lation of the Just Compensation 
Clause until it has used the procedure and been denied just 
compensation. ".. A line decisions presuppose that an award of money 
damages is the excl usive remedy for a taking, provided such a remedy is 
not legally foreclosed. As the Court has stated: "Equitable relief is not 
available to enjoin an alleged taking of private property for a public 
use ... when a suit for compensation can be brought against the sovereign 
subsequent to the taking. ". 
In the B line, the Court adjudicates a takings claim even though the 
claimant has not presented a claim for monetary compensation to the court 
having authority to provide such relief. These cases have not been blessed 
with any uni fy ing moniker analogous to the "Tucker Act doctrine" or the 
"WjJJiamson County doctrine. ~ Sometimes a reason is given for not 
following the A line. The plurality opinion in one case acknowledged the 
departure from the A line position and said that anticipatory relief fo r a 
taking was appropriate given the unique character of the alleged takings 
violation in that case - the imposition of a general monetary liability ... 
More often, the Court does not acknowledge that it is embracing the B line 
rather than the A line." In any event, B line decisions are quite numerous 
18 28 U.s.C. § 1191 (2012). 
19 E.g .. Prcscaull v. ICC. 494 U.S. I, II (1990) ("(Tlaking claims againSllhc Feder~ 1 Governmcnl 
are premature umll Ihe properly owner ha.~ avalled itself of Ihe process provided by Ihe Tucker Act." 
(quoling Williamson Cmy. l~eg' l Plalllling Conuu'n v. Hamilton Bank. 473 U.S. 172, 195 (1985) 
(inlernal quolalion marks omiUed)): see <llso United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes. Inc.. 474 U.S. 
12 1, 127-28 (1985): Ruckelshaus v. MUJlSilJlto Co .. 467 U.S. 986, 1016 (1984): Reg ' l Rail RL'Org. Act 
Cases. 41 9 U.S. 102, 126-27 (1974). 
20 Willialll50JI CIlIy., 473 U.s. at 195: .~ also Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency. 520 U.S. 
725. 733-34 (1997): MacDonald, Sonuner & Frates v. Cmy. of Yolo. 477 U.S. 340, 351 (1986). 
21 Ruckelsliaus. 467 U.s. at 1016. 
22 E. Enters. v. Apfel. 521 U.S. 498, 522 (1998) (plurdlity opinion of O'Cunnor. J.). The plur"Jjty 
reasoned thai requiri!lg the companies to pay moncy and thclI SUC in Ihc CFC 10 gCI it back ·woull.! 
cntail anullerly pointless sct of activities." Id. at 521 (quollng Student Loan Mktg. Ass'n v. Riley. 104 
F.3d 397. 401 (D.C. Cir. 1997)) (internal quotation marks omined): see alS() Duke Power Co. v. 
Carolina Envtl. Study Grp .. Inc .. 438 U.s. 59, 71 n.15 (1978) (entering dL'CI~r~tory judgment with 
respect to tak ings claim in light of conlcnlion Ihat government action could produce "potentially 
urlCornpensab!e damages"J. 
23 For deci~lons upholding takings claims w!thout requiring iKljudlcatinn in a compensallnn court, 
see. [or example. BaMill v. Youpee, 519 U.s. 234 (1997) (declaring amended Indian Land 
Consolidation Act uncunstitutionaJ: nu mention of Tucker Act): Hodel v. flving, 181 U.S. 701 (1987) 
(declaring origiml I nd ian Land Consolidat ion Act unCOlls t it ul ional under T~kings Clause: no IIlCnl ion of 
Tucker Act): WdJb'.f Falmlou.~ Plmrwacies. fllc v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980) (declaring Florida 
statute tramferrlng interest 00 hHel1lleiKler fund to clerk of (ou rt unconstitullonal: no mention of need 
to show state would deny compensation): and Kaiser Aellla v United Stales. 444 U.S. 164 (1979) 
(linding that impoSition of navigation .servilude by the federal ~,'oveml1lent un a private marina would 
be a taking: no menlion of Tucker Act). For decisions rejecting lakings claims arising oul of litigation 
In courts of general jurisdiction without requiring adjudlcallon in a compensation coun, .~".) . [or 
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at the Supreme Court level, probably more so than A line cases."' They 
necessarily presuppose that anticipatory relief is sometimes an appropriate 
remedy for a laking. 
Recent takings decisions by the Court continue the trend. Three of the 
last four takings decisions rendered by the Supreme Couft have embraced 
what I have called the B line. ,' They are: Slop the Beach Renourishment, 
Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection," in which the 
Court considered whether the Florida Supreme Couft had committed a 
judicial taking, even though the claimant had made no attempt to secure 
compensation for the alleged taking in state coum Horne v. Department 
of Agriwlture" in which the Court held that a takings claim could be 
raised defensively in a judicial review proceeding in a court of general 
jurisdiction without the claimant 's first seeking compensation from the 
CFC;" and Koontz v. Sf. Johns River Water Management District, ' in 
which the Court determined that a landowner could pursue a takings 
challenge to an exaction even though the exaction had only been 
threatened and hence no taking had yet occurred. Each decision 
authorized what were, in effect, anticipatory adjudications of takings 
liability. As is generally the case, none of these decisions offered an 
explanation fo r why anticipatory relief, as opposed to a suit in the 
compensation court, was an appropriate remedy for the alleged taking. 
II. 'fA K [ ~ G s RI M [ D I I \ : 51' 'I N G I H [ SI ,\ G [ 
Given that the B line is in ascendancy and the A line in ecl ipse, at least 
for the moment, it is appropriate to step back and ask which position is 
correct. But before turn ing to the question of what remedies should be 
example. ConQv/e Pipe & Products of Califomia, Illc. v. COlis/ruction L.1bore/"s Pemion Trust. 508 
US. 602. 641- 47 (1 993): and Connolly v. Pensioll Benefit Guarallfy Corp .. 475 US , 211. 221- 28 
(1 986) , 
24 Doing a precise hN d COUlIi is complicated lx'Cause sollie cases conlain clemenlS of oolh. In 
Rud.cl5lmu.~. for example. the Coun accepted an appeal fmm a federill distric t coun enjoining cenain 
provisions of the Federal Insect icide. Fungicide. and Rodenticide Act as a taking. 467 U,S, at 990. The 
Coun ruk>d un the merits. accepting sollie of the district coun's cOllcJusiolis and rej l'Cting oll iers. iJut 
lInm rl'Ve='tl the judgment on the ground that any filial adjudication of the takings claim was "not ripe" 
because the claimants could bring an action for compensation in the claims courl under the Tucker Act. 
Id. at 1016- 19. Language in the porrlon of the Coorr' s opinion requiring IffOUrse tn the claims counls 
often cired in 5upfJOn of the A line. see. e,g.. Preseaull. 494 US. at II. but the Court also entered an 
elaoordte dl'Clardwl)' judgment aoout the scope of the Takings Clause IJefore reaching that conclusion. 
consiSlent with the B lille. 
25 TIIC fourth decision. Arkilll&lS Game & Fish CommiS!>iOIl v. Um'!t'(/ Slates. 133 S. CI. 511 (2012). 
arose out of a case filed in the eFe seeking cOlllIICR.<;;l tlnn for a laking by the United States. irl. ~t 517. 
and thus is consislent with the A lille. 
26 130 S. CI. 2592 (2010). 
27 See!d, at 2600-0 1. 
28 133 S. CI. 2053 (20 13). 
29 Id. at 2063. 
30 133 S. CI. 2586 (20 13). 
31 Id. at 2595- 96. 
32 For a recent exchange Oil Ihis issue. from which J have beneflt (.>d . sec John Echeverria. Home v. 
Department of Agriculture: An Inviialiollio i?Lv:xamille "Ripcnn-;s " Doc/rille ill Takings [iligalion. 43 
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available to federal courts for takings of property, it will be helpful to 
survey some principles related to the content of the right created by the 
Takings Clause, the existence of a right of action to enforce that right, 
which court or courts have jurisdiction over takings claims, when takings 
claims are ripe for consideration, and sovereign immunity. 
A. Tile Natllre of the Right 
The Takings Clause, which the Supreme Court has held to be 
enforceable agai nst the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, 
provides: "nor shall private property be taken for public use without just 
compensation.'" The right applies to forced exchanges of property by the 
government. The paradigmatic example is the exercise of the power of 
eminent doma in. When the govern ment condemns property for some 
public use like the construction of a highway, the Takings Clause requires 
that the owner be awarded just compensation. Eminent domain 
pmceedings supply by far the largest number of cases that implicate the 
Takings Clause. Except for a small percentage of eminent domain cases 
that question whether the taking is for a public use, the only constitutional 
question of significance in such cases concerns the proper measure of 
compensation. 
The Supreme Court has held that the Takings Clause also applies in 
certai n cases where an owner claims the government has "taken'" her 
property but the government denies that any taking has occurred. These 
are variously referred to as inverse condemnations , implicit takings, or 
regu latory takings (hereinafter referred to collectively as regulatory 
takings) . , The classic statement recognizi ng such a claim, often quoted 
(and equally often lamented) , is that a regu lation will be deemed a ta king 
if it "goes too far." A better formu lation is the Court's more recent 
statement that government actions will be recognized to be takings if they 
are "functionally equivalent'" to an exercise of eminent domain. ' In other 
E! " l . L. Ru . 10.735 (2013): and Michael W. McConnell. Home and tfle Normalization of Takings 
Litigation: A Response to Professor Echeverria. 43 E.I \ I I . L. Rl r . 10.719 (2013). 
33 The S!~ ndard citation is Chicago. Burlington & Quincy Raih"Oad Co. v. Chicago. 166 U.s. 226 
(1897). For all intcresting argumcnt t"Mtllc Court did nol fu lly incorporatc thc Takings Clause through 
Ihe Due Proce<>.~ Clause unril Hmn Central Transporlalion Co. v. New York City. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
see Bradley C. Karkkainen. nlf: Police Power Revisited: PlmtJIolII Incorporation and tllf: Roots of the 
lakillgs ·"Muddle. "90 Mil l. L. REI . 826 (2006). 
34 U.S.COlll .amend. V. 
35 £.g .. Kelo v. City of Ncw London. 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
36 For dL'iC ussion of the differences belween condemnalion and inverse condemnallon. see United 
SlaWS v. Clarke. 445 U.s. 253. 255- 58 (1980). Thai case held lhal a statute au rhorizing condemnation 
did not penHi! the govemment 10 take property without formal condemnation procet.>dings. which would 
have forced la[}(lovmcrs 10 bring inverse condemnation suit s 10 seck recompc nse for governmenta l 
laklngs. 
37 Pa . Co.11 Co. v. Mahon. 260 U.s. 393. 41 5 (1922) . For rhe lamelll, see. for example. Lucas I< 
SoU/II C1rolilh1 Coastal Council. 505 U.S. 1003. 1015 (1992) ("[Olur decision in Mallon offered liu le 
insight into when. and under what circumstances. a given regulation would be seen as going ' too far ' 
for purposes of the Fifth Amcndmcnt."). 
38 Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. 544 U.s. 528. 539 {2005}. The Court's prec ise words were: 
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words, the Takings Clause includes an anticircumvention principle to the 
effect lhat the government cannot avoid its obligation to pay compensation 
by declining to exercise the power of eminent domain when "in all fairness 
and juslice~ it should do so: ' The Court has developed a series of 
categorical and ad hoc tests for determining when liability for a regulatory 
taking occurs, which are largely tangential to our inquiry about remedies." 
The Takings Clause is unique in one respect, which has a direct bearing 
on what remedies are appropriate for a violation of the Clause. Unlike 
other provisions of the Constitution , the Court has held lhat the Takings 
Clause establishes a right of compensation - and only a right of 
compens ation - for certain government actions, namely. those that "take" 
private property for public use. As the Court put it in an often-quoted 
passage: 
[The Takings Clause] does not prohi bit the taking of pri vate property, but 
instead places a condition on the exercise of Ihal power. This basic 
understanding of (he Amendment makes dear Ihal it is designed not to limit 
(he governmental interference with property rights per se, but rather to secure 
compensation in (he evelll of otherwise proper interference amounting to a 
taking.' 
This understanding of the nature of the substantive right draws support 
from the language of the Takings Clause, whose prohibitory language says 
"without just compensation, "" In contrast, the Due Process Clause. 
appearing immediately before the Takings Clause. says that the 
government shall not deprive persons of property "without due process of 
law.H,. The Takings Clause therefore appears to be a discrete prohibition 
against depriving owners of compensation when their property is taken for 
public use, Other government interferences with property. such as taking 
property without notice or a hearing, are constrained by the Due Process 
Clause, 
Given the nature of the substaillive right created by the Takings Clause. 
it is fai r to say that the presumptive remedy for an otherwise permissible 
laking is an award of compensalion, that is, money damages, Whether the 
nature of the right requires thal compensation be regarded as the exclusive 
remedy is the question this Essay lakes up in Part Ill. 
"functionally equivalent 10 the classic taking in which govemlllen t d irectly approprlates private 
property or oUSts the owner from his domain. " {d. 
39 Annstrong v. United States. 364 U.s. 40. 49 (1960). For d iscussion of thiS aspec t of Lif/gle. see 
1ll0ma:; W. Merrill, Why Lingle is Half Righi. II VI . 1. El \'! I L 421 (201 0). 
40 See generally DlI n A. Dn I 8,', TH MI! W. Ml tllL l . Pi 0 PI 111 : Til l II! 86- 168 (2002) 
(providing an ovelView of categorica l and ad hoc tests for when a regulatory taking occurs). 
11 Fi151 English Evangelical Luthemn Church of Glendale v, Cnly , of Los Angeles. 182 US. 301. 
311- 15 (1987) (citations omillcd): see also Williamson Cnly. Reg'[ Planning Comm' n v. Hamilton 
Bank. 173 U.s. 172. 194 (1985) ("TIle Fifth Amendment does nm proscrihe the lak ing of propeny: it 
proscri bes taking wirhoUl just compen.·wlnn. "). 
42 US. a is! . amend. V (" INlor shall privale propeny be ta ken for public use without j ust 
compensatioTl. "j. 
43 Id. ("INjor Ishall any personl be deWived of life, liberty, or property, Without due process of law 
. . . .. ). 
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B. Right of Action 
When the government exercises the power of eminent domain, the 
Takings Clause will come into play defensive ly, if at all. The owner will 
claim that the govenunent is not offering just compensation or, on rare 
occasions, will say that the taking is not for a public use. There is no need 
to identity a right of action in order to raise a constitutional right 
defensive ly against the government If the government deni es takings 
liabili ty, however. and the owner goes on the offensive, arguing that the 
action is a regu latory taking, then it will be necessary for the owner to 
identify a right of action that allows the owner to bring such a claim 
before a court 
The requirement of identify ing a right of action can be the undoing of 
plaintiffs in many non-takings contexts," For plaintiffs asserting 
regulatory takings claims , however, these potential pitfalls do not exist 
The Court has recognized that the Tak ings Clause incorporates with in its 
text a ri ght of action for compensation in the event of a taking of property 
for public use," The constitutional requ irement that the government pay 
just compensation for takings, the Court has said, is "self-executing,"" and 
requires no "[sltalUtory recognition.''+ , Thus, regulatory takings claimants 
do not need a statutory right of action ; they need look no further than "the 
Constitution itself,"" 
Uncertainty exists about whether it is possible to bring an action under 
the Takings Clause seeking anticipatory relief, as opposed to an award of 
just compensation - the top ic of this Essay. But this is more properly 
considered a controversy about remedies. not about the existence of a right 
of action. 
C. jurisdiction 
It is also necessary to determine whether a court has jurisdiction over a 
constitutional comroversy. With respect to takings claims. the general 
pattern is that when the government exercises the power of eminent 
domain, jurisdiction is straightforward; when an owner seeks to bring a 
regulatory takings claim against the government. jurisdiction is more 
complicated. 
41 The Courfs current viL'W. for example, is th~t a priv~te right of ~ction to enforce a federal SlatUle 
docs not exist unless it can be shovm thai Congress intended to crea te one, Stoneridge IlIv, Partners. 
Lt C v. Scient ific-Atlanta, Inc .. 552 U.s. 148. 164- 65 (2008): Alexander v. 5.lndoval, 532 US 275. 
286-87 (2001). 
45 See FirSI EI![;lisfI. 482 U.S, al 315. 
46 {d. (quoting Uniwd Slates v. Clarke. 145 U.s. 253. 257 (1980)). 
47 /d. (quoling Jacobs v. United States. 290 U.s. 13. 16 (1933)). 
48 Id. The Tucker Act confers jurisdkHon over regulatory tak lng.~ cl~ l nl~ again.~1 Ihe federal 
govenulICIlI. Unl red Stales v. MitchelL 445 US 535. 538 (1980). Bul the Act does nor itself create 
-any substantive right enforceable aga ins t the United SI~res for money dam~ges , " /d. (quoting United 
Slates v. Te:sTan. 124 Us. 392. 398 (1976)) (i lltem~1 quolalion mark omitted). The Takings Clause is 
today understood to supply the right of aCtion. See Prescault v. ICC. 494 U.S. 1, 11 - 12 (1990): United 
Stales v. Causby. 328 U.S. 256. 267 (1946): jacobs. 290 U.s. al 16. 
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Where the federal government seeks to take property by eminent 
domain, the district courts have original jurisdiction... Appeals, as usual, 
go to the regional court of appeals and then via certiorari to the U.S. 
Supreme Court. When an owner contends his property has been taken and 
the federal government denies any obligation to pay compensation, the 
Tucker Act prescribes a different allocation of j udicial authority. Claims 
seeking compensation of $10,000 or less can be brought either in a federal 
district court or in the CFe. , With respect to claims seeking compensation 
of more than $10,000 , the CFe has exclusive j urisdiction. Appeals in 
cases brought under the Tucker Act in either the district court or the CFe 
go to the Court of Appeals fo r the Federal Circuit. · Judgments of the 
Federal Circuit can be challenged, on petition for certiorari, to the 
Supreme Court. 
When a state or one of its instrumentalities seeks to take property by 
eminent domain , state law dictates the procedure to be fo llowed. These 
procedures vary conSiderably from state to state. Some states require 
initial determinations by commissioners, others call for jury verdicts. In 
parallel with federal practice, nearly all states subject eminent domain 
proceedings to the supervision of courts of general jurisdiction. Whatever 
procedure applies, the jurisdictional rules are generally well established. 
Constitutional issues that arise in state eminent domain proceedings are 
usually framed as a matter of 
state constitutional law. If issues in such proceedings arise under the 
federal Takings Clause, they can be resolved by the state courts , subject to 
normal state appellate review and the possibility of further review by the 
U.S. Supreme Court. 
Regulatory taking cases under state takings law are more difficult to 
generalize about. Most states have no statutes that indicate which court 
has j urisdiction over such a claim. The dominant practice is to bring these 
actions in courts of general jurisdiction, subject to ordinary appeals 
processes. ' Some states require a regulatory takings claimant to bring an 
49 See21! U.s.c. § 1351! (2012). 
50 Seeid, § 1346(a}(2). 
51 See id. § 1491(a}(1). The Supreme Cou'" has observed that the assumption of exclusive 
Jurisdiction Is -nor based 011 any language In the Tucker ACT.- Bowen v. Mas.'klchusells. 487 U.S. 879. 
910 n,48 (1988), However. given that the Tucker Act gives districT courts concurrent jurisdicTion only 
over claims for $10.000 Of less. any interpretation that allowed districT couns to consider claims for 
morc than $10.000 under their general fC<.lcral question jurisdiction would effectively nullify the 
$10.000 limitation. On thiS Imsis. H,e FC<.Ieral Circuit hilS held tlliltthe CFC"sjuri sdiClion over takings 
cla ims for more tl~1n $10.000 Is Impliedly exclusive. Broughton Lumher Co, v. Yeuller. 939 F.2d 1547 , 
1556 (Fed, Cir. 19(1). 
52 See21! U.s.C. § 1295(a)(2)- (3). 
53 SeeAw . Bt l N l ·' OJ! l lill!] I I . ~ III' & L\' I USE C' M • .. TIl Ltl I F & 1' 11 1 
~ iltl : Fl rTI·SJI !E S(I I EI (WUliamG. Blakeed .. 20 12) Iherelnafter Fl FTI-SJI IE 5I: 11'EI ]. The 
book COll~i~l~ of descr!lHiOll~ by waclit lonCfS of state takings procedures In each of the fifty states. 
54 Some STates. mOST promi llently Califomia. once denied the exiSTence of an action for inverse 
condenmation. ·nley held that an 01111er who objects to a state action as a taking must bring an action 
in mandamus or for a declaratory judgment ho lding the state action unconstitution~! as an 
ullCornpell~ated laking. St>/.), e,g.. Agins v. City of Tiburon. 598 P.2d 25. 28 (Cal. 1979). aff·d 011 Oilier 
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action in mandamus, seeking to direct the government to commence an 
eminent domain proceeding. Five states have specialized claims courts 
analogous to lhe CFC, but lhe jurisdictional rules about whether regulatory 
lakings cases must be broughl in such courts appear to be confused or at 
least underdeveloped."' Regulatory takings claims against county or 
municipal governmeIlls can also be brought in federal district court under 
42 U.s.c. § 1983, with jurisdiction based on 28 U.s.c. § 1331 or § 1343. ' 
D. justiciability 
The Court has held that any claimant seeking to bring an action in 
federal court must satisfy standing, ripeness, and mootness limitations 
grounded in Art icle III of the Constitution, limiting federal courts to 
deciding "cases" and "controvers ies . ~ ' Eminent domain cases, aga in , 
almost never present any issue of justiciability. Eminent domain actions 
are commenced by the government (or an entity like a utility company 
exercising delegated power from the government). The owner, as 
defendant, obviously has standing to object to the proposed seizure of her 
property, and the controversy is vi rtua lly always ripe for decision. ' 
In regu latory takings cases, standing may be an issue, for example, if 
the regu lation is a general one or if it will not become effective until so me 
time in the future. But stand ing in such cases will be determined by 
applying ord inary standing doctrine, without any twists unique to the 
taki ngs context. 
With respect to ripeness, however, the Court has imposed two 
grounds. 447 U.S. 255 (1980). TIl is had the e ffcct of limiting relid 10 prosllcclive invalidation. and 
precluded allY cornpen.<;.alion for the period between the taking allli the judlclal order InvaHdallng rhe 
governmem aClioli. In First Ellglish Evangelical Lurllerall O/Urcll of Glelldale v Coullly of Los 
Angeles. 482 U.S. 304 (1987). Ihe Supreme Court held thar rhis "invalidarion only" stare procedural 
rule was unconstitutional untler the fl!dernl Takings Clause. oc'Cause it created the pros]JL'Ct of 
urlCornpensalcd temporary takings. fd. at 322. AFter Firsl EngliSh. it appeal1> Ihat rlCarly all states now 
recognize sollie form of Inverse condenmarlon or regulMory raking acTion seeking cornpcll<;.alion. 
Practitioners in fony-six stares and rhe District of Columbia describe their states as recognizing inverse 
condemmlion aClions: rIO infonnalioll is provided for four Slates (AlabaJlI<I. NL'W Jerst-')'. Oklahoma. and 
WashinglOn}. which may si mply reflL'Ct the lack of prominence of Ihe issue for practitioners relative 10 
conventional eminent domain proceedings. x>e Fr F T) -SI i , E Sr 1 \ E T • suprilllore 53. 
55 See Fr r , I -S! 11 E Sc I ' E! , supra ll/(: 53, at 170- 71 . 249. 399 (describIng Iowa, Milmesora, and 
Ohio as falling into this ca tegory): see also id. at 38 1- 82 (explaining Ihat North Carolina allows 
landownelS claiming inverse condemnation or regulatory laking 10 inslitute condemnation proCl!eding 
itS if corldenming authori ty had done so). 
56 See John Martine~. A Proposal for &Iilblishiflg Speciillized F~>derill ilnd SI8Ie "Takifl[p' Couns. " 
61 ME . L RE , . 467. 482- 89 (2009). 
57 Of course. such claims Illay be subject 10 ripeness requirements. discussed inunediately belaw. 
58 SeegelleraJIyRi c l ll1 H. F1ll I J .Jl . tr Il .. HIlI I I I WEC I SlE t '! TI!E FIIEtll Cl llt! 
1' 1 , I E Fl. 1 E III S1" 5 , E W 100- 222 (61h ed. 2009). 
59 See Henry M. Hart . Jr., T1!e Power of Congress 10 Limil Ihe juriwficlioll of H'(leml CouJ"ls: All 
Exercise in Dialectic. 66 HI 1 \ . L RI \ . 1362. 1372 (1953): Anronin $calla. 771C DoclriJl(~ of Swnding 
as IlJ/ Esselllial EJemeJJl of IIJe Separation of Powers, 17 SiJ E J 0 I I U. L RI \ . 881. 894 (1983) 
("(Wlhen an individual who is die very objecrof a law's rL'lluirement or prohibition seeks to challenge 
it. he always has standing:). Issues of mootness could ali se if Ihe govemmcnt announces it may 
abandon the pmJect associated wilh a condemnation. but I do nor cOll~ider Ihese quesriOll~ here. 
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requiremems that apply specifically in takings cases. One holds that a 
takings claim "is not ripe umil the government ... has reached a final 
decision regarding the application of the regulationfl to the properly at 
issue.~ ·1 This requirement of administrative finality has proven to be 
elusive in its application. Local land use regulation tends to resemble a 
kind of ping-pong match between developers and regulators, in which a 
developer submits a proposal, the proposal is rejected by regulators, the 
developer submits a scaled-down proposal, this 100 is rejected by 
regulators, and so forth." It is often unclear when this 
back-and-forth process has come to rest. Property owners therefore 
frequently face considerable uncertainty aboul whether or when the local 
land use aUlhority has announced a "final" position on whal lype of 
development is permiued. ' 
The olher ripeness doctrine requires that a claimant challenging a stale 
or local regulalion show that compensation is not available from the Slate 
before any action can be broughl in federal court." The Court derived this 
ri peness requirement from its underslanding of the nalure of lhe 
constitutional righl created by the Takings Clause. Since the Clause 
proscribes only the taking of property without just compensation, the Court 
reasoned that there is no constitutional violalion unless the government 
refuses lO compensate." Consequently, "if a Stale provides an adequate 
procedure for seeking jusl compensation, the property owner cannot claim 
a violalion of the Just Compensation Clause until it has used the procedure 
and been denied just compensation. "" This ripeness requirement (perhaps 
more accurately characterized as an exhaustion of remedies requirement) is 
one of the pillars of what I have called the A line cases, which restrict 
remedies for lakings lO money compensalion. 
£. Sovereign immunity 
The principle of sovereign immunity is nol found in the text of the 
Consti tution, other Ihan its partial recognition in the Eleventh Amendment, 
60 Williamson Cnly. Reg'l PlarUling Cormn'n v. Hamilton Bank. 473 U.S. 172. 186 {l985}. 
61 Evidence of this process is reflected in the facts of several Supreme Court decisions. See. e.g, 
City of Monterey v. Del MoniC Dunes at MonlerC)'. LId .. 526 U.s. 687. 698 (1999) {"A rt er five years, 
nve fonnal decL~IOll~ , and 19 different site plans. Del "'·lome Duoes commenced suit against the 
cily .... The District Coun dismissed the claims as unripe under Williamson County . . . : (citation 
omitted)): Williamsou Cnty .. 473 U.S. at 177- 82 (describing a seven-year process consiSling of plan 
su!Jmissions. d isapprovals, amendments, approva ls. and reversa ls of approvals). 
62 TIIC SuprenlC Court has oneil inte rpreted the nnalily requirenlCnt in a flexible way. especially 
when it wants to reach the merits. Sec. e.g.. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island. 533 U.S. 606. 625- 26 (2001 ) 
(no need to seek variance for specific project when permit to develop parcel denied): SuHum v. Tahoe 
Reg') Planning Agency. 520 U.S. 725, 739 (1997) (no nL'ClI to seek va riance or to attempt to sell 
transferable devclOPJllCnt rights when regulations forbade building on undeveloped 101): Lucas v. S.c. 
Coa.~tal Council. 505 U.S. 1003. 101 1- 12 (1992) (no need to seek variance under amended statote 
enacted after initial denial of develollment permit). TIl!;se fact -specific dec isions provide Iiltle goi(L1nce 
to lower courts. 
63 Williamson Cn{y .. 173 U.S. at 194 . 
M Id. at 194- 95. 
65 /d. at 195. 
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which says "the Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed 
to extend" to suits against the states by citizens of other states or subjects 
of foreign states. ' Nevertheless the Court has insisted, especially in recent 
decades, that sovereign immunity is an implicit premise of the 
constitutional design and that it applies to the federal government and the 
states alike.' The basic rule, accordingly, is that neither the federal 
government nor the states can be sued without their consent 
Like the other limitations on constitutional litigation previously 
discussed, sovereign immunity is not an issue in eminent domain 
proceedings. The government is the moving party, and must initiate 
j udicial proceedings to complete a transfer of tiLle. In so doing, the 
government necessarily consents to judicial determination of questions 
about the scope of its obligations under the Constitution. 
The problems, as always, arise in regulatory takings cases. With 
respect to the federal government, the APA contains a general waiver of 
sovereign immunity for actions seeking relief other than "money 
damages. "" Thus, insofa r as one can seek declaratory or equitable relief 
for takings (the issue of this Essay). the APA clears the way fo r suits in 
federal courts of general jurisdiction. The Tucker Act, which authorizes 
suits against the United States founded "upon the Constitution . "" has been 
held to constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity for claims seeking 
compensation for takings... Because there is no other waiver of federal 
sovereign immunity for claims fo r compensation, sovereign immunity 
stands as a barrier to such claims outSide the jurisdictional limits 
prescribed by the Tucker Act Other than claims for $10,000 or less, this 
66 U.s. Co JIT . amend. XI. 
67 FDIC v. Meyer, 510 u.s. 471. 475 (1994) ("AbsenT a waiver, sovereign irlllllunHy shie lds the 
Federal Govemmenr and its agencies from suir.") : United Srares v. Mlrchell. 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983) 
("It is axiomark thar the United States may not be sued without its consent and that the existence of 
consent is a prerequisite for j urisdiction.") . Stale sovereign immunily is similarly 'axiomatic." See 
Alden v. Maine, 5Z7 U.s. 706, 713 (1999) ('[A]s the Constitution's structu re. irs history. and the 
authoritative inte '1)rctalions by thiS Cour1 make clear. tire Statcs' inrrrrunity from suiT is a fundamental 
aSJlccl of the sovereignty which rhe Slares enjoyed hefore rhe rarlfical ioll of the Consrirur lon. and whleh 
they retain today ... excepr as altered by Ihe plan of the Convention or cenain constitutional 
Amendments."): Hans v. louisiana. 134 U.s. I, 16 (1890) ("The suability of a SlaW without its consent 
WdS a thing unknown to the law[.] This has been so often laid down and acknowledged by couns and 
jurists (hat it is hardly rlCCCSS<lry 10 be formally asscrted."). 
68 5 U.S.C. § 702 (20 12). The starure reads in pan: 
An action in a court of rhe United Stares seeking relief orhe r than money damages arid srarlng 
a claim that an agency or an officer or employee thereof aCled or failed to act in an official 
cilpacify or under color of legal authority shall Jlot be dismissed nor relief therein be tlenied 
on The ground 1I.at it is against the United States or that the United States is an indispensable 
party. 
fd. hr & .... en v. Massaclluselfs. 187 U.s. 879 (l988). the Court pennitted tire State to usc the Ai 'A to 
recover moncy from (he United Statcs under a (heory of equitable restit ution. See id. at 893. It now 
appears rhe decision has been confi rH'd to It~ facts. Sec Grear-W. LIfe &. Annuity Ins. Co. v. Kllud~on. 
531 U.s. 204. 212 (2002): Del)' r of the Army v. Blue Fox. Inc .. 525 U.s. 255. 261 - 63 (1999). 
69 28 U.s.C. § 149I(a)(l) (2012). 
70 See Milchell. 163 U.s. at 212- 16. 
71 See Webster v. Doc, 486 U.S. 592. 6 13 (1988) (Sca lia, 1.. disscnting) (-No one would suggest 
thar. if Congress had nor passed rhe Tucker Act. the cou rrs would he able 10 order disburscment~ from 
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limitation means that the CFe must hear all regulatory takings claims 
seeking monetary compensation. 
With respect to federal takings claims brought against slate and local 
governments . the sovereign immunity issue is more complex. County and 
municipal governments do n Ol enjoy sovereign immunity. Consequently, 
Lhey can be sued under 42 USc. § 1983, and federal courts can order 
either declaratory or equitable relief. or they can award the payment of 
compensation by such units, without encountering any sovereign immunity 
barrier. Claims againsl stales and state agencies are more problematic. 
Insofar as a claimant seeks declaratory or equitable relief. he can obtain 
such relief by suing one or more state officers under the authority of Ex 
p8l1e Young. ' An officer suit seeking compensation from the state itself, 
however, would likely be doomed. Congress in theory might be able to 
create such a remedy against the states by legislating under its authority in 
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. ' But such a remedy would have 
to be congruent and proportionate to a record of state violations of the 
Takings Clause, which recent decisions suggest is a difficult barrier to 
surmount. ' In any event, there is no such legislation currently on the 
books (42 U.s.C. § 1983 does not apply to stales inasmuch as they are not 
"persons" within the meaning of the Act' ,). 
Some commentators and lower courts have concluded that the "self-
the Treasury 10 pay for properly taken under lawful authorily (and subse<:luenlly dcstroyed) withoul just 
compen.'iiUlnn." (c!ration omirred)). Fnr direcT authori ty sup\Xll1ing this pmlXlsilion. which i'i rather 
dated hut has not been overruled. see Lyndl v. UII;/cd Swcs, 292 U.S. 571. 579. 580- 82 (1934); and 
Schillinger v. UtJiledStalCs. 155 U.s. 163. 168 (1894). 
72 Lake Counuy Estates, Ilic. v. Tahoe Reg 'l I'lalining Agency. 440 U.s. 391. 400- 02 (1979); 
Uncoln Cnly. v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530-31 (1890). 
73 See, c.g .. City nf Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at MOlllerey. Ltd .. 526 U.S. 687, 694 (1999) 
(upholdingjUlY verdict of$ I.45 million against city in a § 1983 regulatory takings action). 
74 209 U.s. 123. ISS-56, 159- 60 (1908). Although there is controversy about the rationale and 
scope of actions based on Ex parle Young, see, e.g .. David L. Shapiro. Ex Pane Young and /he Uses of 
lIislolY, 67 N.Y.U. A~ i . So I' , Ai . L. 69. 74- 81 (20 11). Ihe dec ision is securely cslablished as a means 
of overcoming the defense of sovereign Immunity where actlOll'i for equilable relief are concerned. see 
Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. SeN. Comm'n. 535 U.s. 635. 645 (2002) ("In determining whether the 
doctrine of Ex parle YOIlIIg avoids an Eleventh Amendment bar to suit. a court net.'ll only conduct a 
'su<lightforward uliluiry into whether [the[ compl~illt alleh>eS ~n ongoing violatioll of federal I~w and 
seeks relieF properly charOCleriwd as prospective. '" (alteration in Original) (cilation omitted) (quoting 
Idaho v. Coeur d 'Alerle Trihe of Idaho. 52 1 U.S. 261. 296 (1997) (O'Connor, 1.. concurring in p~rt and 
concurring Ul the judgment))). 
75 See Edelm~n v. Jordan. 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1 974) ("[WIllen the action is UI essellce one for the 
recovery of money from Ihe stale, Ihe Sl ~tc is Ihe real. substanlial l),'lrly ill inlerest and is entitled 10 
invoke ilS sovereign immunity from su il even Ihough individual offi Cials are nomiml <.Icfend~nIS: 
(~lteration in original) (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Dep'[ of Treasury, 323 U.s. 459. 464 (1945)) 
(internal qU0l3lion marks omitted)): see a/so In reAyers. 123 U.s. 443. 507- 08 (1887) (holding [h~t 
officer suit may not lJe USL'll to require specific performance of a contract by a state). 
76 See Filzpalrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976). 
77 See City of Boerne v. Flores. 521 U.s. 507. 520 (1997). 
78 ,'iCc, e.g., Fla. Prepaid Posl<;eCOl}{lary Educ. Expell~e Bd. v. Coli . Sav. Bank. 527 U.S. 627. 642-
48 (1999) (refusing to find that a federal STatute permining patent infringement suits aga inst states 
re necK'll ~ valid abrog~t ion of state sovereign immunity under the Fourtl'emh Amendment OC'CH Use 
Congress had nOI cstablished a pattern of slale diSf('g~rd of palent fights). 
79 wm v.l\·lich. Dep't of State Police. 491 U.s. 58. 64 (1989). 
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executing" right of action found to exist in the text of the Takings Clause 
should be deemed to be a waiver of sovereign immunity." A cryptic 
footnote in one Supreme Court decision has been said to suggest this 
resu lt.' but it was at most dictum." A more recent decision indicates the 
issue is unresolved." The early history of regulatory takings actions 
suggests that the Takings Clause was not regarded as having abrogated 
state sovereign immunity." The takings issue arose in tort suits seeking 
damages from or injunctive relief against officers.' The officer would 
defend against the suit by citing the state statute authorizing the taking; the 
plaintiff would then invoke the state takings clause in an effort to strip 
away the officer's justification that the taking was authorized by statute." 
Except in a few instances where the state legislature adopted a statutory 
mechanism for seeking compensation,' the only mechanism for securing 
compensation from the government was through a private bill enacted by 
the legislature." In short, "It]he United States Supreme Court, while 
adopting the view that the Just Compensation Clause is 'self-
executing ... with respect to compensation[.]' has never held that the 
80 See. c.g.. Eric Berger. T11C CoJ/i.~;on of I/IC Tilldng.~ ilnd Slale Sovcreign IlIlmunily DocI";I1I':">. 63 
W. \ I . & l.J ( L. R1 1. 493. 498 (2006). A few STate courts have agreed. holding that the federal 
T~kings Clause permits litigants to ~ssert takings claims ag~inst the state in state court. See BOise 
Cascade Corp. v. Oregon. 991 P2d 563. 569 (Or. Cr. ApI)· 1999): SODS. Inc. v. Stare. 650 NW.2d 1. 9 
(S.D. 2002). Other state court~ have held that state takings clauses abrogate state sovereign immunity. 
Chick Springs Water Co. v. State Highway Dep't , 157 S.E. 842, 850 (S.c. 1931). ovcnulcll OI! Ol/ICI" 
gJvullds by McCall ex rei. Andrews v. Balson. 329 S.E.2d 74 1 (S.C. 1985). Lower federal courts. in 
comraSl. have generally held that the Elevemh Amendment 0a1S takings claims against state 
govemmenlS in federal couf1. !X>e Berger. ~upl"a. al 495 nA. 
81 See Berger. supra note 80, at 494- 95. 
82 Fi lSl English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Cnly. of Los Angeles. 482 U.s. 304. 
316 n.9 (1987). The case involved a claim for a temJXIrary taking by a county. which enjoys no 
sovereign immunity. See id. ill 31 1. 
83 Ci ty of Monterey v. Dcl Monte Dunes al Monterey. lid .. 526 U.s. 687. 714 (1999) (pluralily 
opinion). 
84 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae SUPJXIning Appellee at 19- 23. Firsl English 
482 U.s. 304 (No. 85-119'J) . 1986 WL 727420. 
85 See Unill'd SlateS v. Lee. 106 U.S. !96. 218- 23 (I882) (holding tha t remedy for an owner whose 
I~nd was unlawfully sei%W hy the govenlmcnl was an il!iunction against continued possession by the 
relevant officers). 
86 I~ober! Brauneis. TIle Firs! COIIS!iIUliona/ TOri: The Remedial Remlu!ion in Nineleelll/!.CeIllUlY 
Srarejusl COl1!pen5alion Law. 52 VI II . L. Rt l . 57. 67- 68 {I 999) . 
87 See Kris W. Kollach. The OrigitlS of Regu/atory Taki/Jg~ : Sell;ng tbe Record Slra;g/lI. 1996 Ul ll 
L Rl \ . 1211. 1243- 44 (describing sialuies enacled by Pennsylvania ~nd Ohio in the firsl half of the 
nineteenth century Ihat allo .... 'ed OIV!lCrs to sue for comp{'1l~atlon for h!i uries 10 riparian right~). 
88 See A. L 1 I ! I T .11 .. supm note 58. at 859- 60. This was the only mode of securing compensation 
direcrly from rile federal govemmem before rile Tucker Act was enacll'd in 1887. See id. at 859-61. 
Although Ihe Act conferrctl jurisdiction on Ihe Courl of Claims to [ellder judgulCnl 'upon any claim 
against the Unlled States founded ... upon the COIl~tiHllion: 28 U.S.c. § 1491 (2012). the onginal 
rationa le for awarding compensal ion for takings was based nn the imputation of an implied promise hy 
the United States to pay for proJleny it had taken. United States v. Greal Falls Mfg. Co .. 112 U.S. 645. 
656- 57 (I884). Only much later did tile Cour! rationa lize the dUly as being foundt!d 'uJXIn tile 
Constilution," thai is. as nowing directly from the Takings Clause. See United Stales v. Causby. 328 
U.S. 256. 267 (1946); Jacohs v. United States, 290 U.s. 13. 16 (1933). 
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Clause abrogates either federal or state sovereign immunity. ~" 
Given this history, and the Court's recent reaffirmations of sovereign 
immunity at both the federal and state levels , this Essay assumes thaI 
sovereign immunity continues to apply to any claim of federal- or stale-
government taking brought in federal court. As we have seen, sovereign 
immunity is rather easily circumvented when a claimant seeks injunctive 
or declaratory relief. but poses a much more serious barrier when the 
request is for monetary relief. The disparate treatment of prospective and 
retrospective relief - reflected bOlh in legislative waivers of immunity 
and judicial interpretation of the scope of sovereign immunity - reveals 
that suits seeking monetary relief for government actions are politically 
sensitive in a way that suits for mandatory relief are not. Consequently, 
this Essay assumes that any actual award of compensation against the 
federal government must always comply with the limited waiver of 
sovereign immunity in the Tucker Act. And any award of compensation 
against a state government or state agency would have to be entered by a 
court (presumably a state court) where the state legislature has consented 
to the entry of such awards. 
III. CO~\ I I IU I I O~,\L U Wl i l D~ n K I~ G I RI. ~IDIIS 
We are now in a position to see how the Court , at least in some of its 
dec isions, has reached the conclusion this Essay calls the A line position: 
that the exclusive remedy for an alleged violation of the Tak ings Clause is 
an action in a compensation court seeking monetary relief. The A line 
position has been deduced from two strands of reasoning. The first is 
grounded in the unique nature of the constitutional right created by the 
Takings Clause. The second is derived from the allocation of jurisdiction 
to consider takings claims and the associated princip le of sovereign 
immunity. Neither strand of reasoning is correct. 
A. The Nature of rhe Righr 
As we have seen, the Takings Clause, unlike other provisions of the 
Constitution. is unique in that it establishes only a right of compensation 
for certain government actions. namely, those that "take" private property 
for public use." In the vernacular made popular by Guido Calabresi and 
Douglas Melamed, the clause creates a liability rule, not a property rule or 
an inalienability rule." Based on the unique nalure of the right, the 
Supreme Court has concluded, most explicitly in Williamson COllIlty, thal a 
89 Brauneis. supra /IOle 86. ~t 137- 38 (second ~lId third ~ iterdtions in origina l) (footnotes omitted) 
(quoting United StMes v, Clarke. 445 U.s. 253. 257 (1980)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
90 First English EvangeliCil l Lutheran Chul'(h v. Cnly. of Los Angeles. 482 U.s. 304. 31 5 (1987); 
Sl'e also WIJHanl<;()n Cnry. Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamlhon B.1nk , 473 U.s. 172. 194 (1985) ("TIle 
Fifth Amendment does IKlt proscribe the taking of property; it proscribes taking without just 
oompensation. "), 
91 Guido CalalJresi & A. Douglas Melamed. Properly Rulel>', Liilbiliry Rules. alld Illaliellilbilily: GlIe 
View of 11m Cathedral, 85 HI I I . L. Rl i . 1089 (1972). 
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constitutional vio lation of the Takings Clause does not occur until 
compensation is denied . From this, the Court has further concluded that a 
federal takings claim is not ripe unless and until a claimant has sought and 
been denied compensation in the relevant compensation court. 
These conclusions do not follow from the premise. The flaw in the 
logic is the first step - the proposition that no violation of the right 
occurs until relief is denied. Given the nature of the right, it is equally if 
not more plausible that a violation is complete when property is taken and 
the government does not offer to pay compensation. The ordinary rule in 
constitutional law is that "the constitutionally offensive state action occurs 
at the point at which the state official acts . "" 
Williamson County's notion that a substantive deprivation occurs only when 
the state fails to provide a jXlst-deprivation remedy is exceptional." 
Indeed, the rule implicitly followed in eminent domain proceedings is 
that a violation of the Takings Clause is complete when the government 
condemns property without offering to pay just compensation. We know 
this because property owners, as defendants in eminent domain actions, 
routinely object to offers of compensation they regard as unjust." And 
they object on the ground that the offer violates the Takings Clause (or its 
state equivalent). The court overseeing the action will rule on these 
objections. If the owner is dissatisfied with the court's ruling, the owner 
can appeal. The eminent domain action is 1I0t final until an amount 
deemed to satisfy the requirement of "just compensation" has been 
identified and paid. There is no suggestion that the owner subject to 
eminent domain must file a separate lawsuit demanding just compensation 
92 Henry Paul Monaghan. Commen!. Slal'~ Law Wmngs. Sl,1Ie Law RCIlILY/ies, and Ihe FOUf1~'eIJIh 
AmendmeJ!l. 86 Co lEI . L Rl \ .979.996 (1986) (citing Home Tel. & Tet. Co. v, City of Los Angeles. 
2Z7 U.S, 278 (191 3)): see,1/soZinerrnon v. Burch. 494 U.S, 113. 125 ( t990) (stating thaI. with respect 
to substantive as opposed 10 proceduml rights. "the constitutional violation ... is cOTlllllell' when the 
wrongful action is taken" (c iting Daniels v. Williams, 474 US 327, 338 (1986) (Steverls, L COrlcurrirlg 
In thejllllgmen!s))). 
93 A somewhat parallel exception. noted hy the Court in support of its analysis in Williamson 
CoulI/y. is the one for "randoTll and unauthoriled" deprivations of property hy govemment officials. 
473 U.s. at 195. The Court held in PaFTall v. li1yJOT. 451 U.S. 527. 543- 14 (1981) : and Hudson v, 
PaJmfr. 468 U.s. 517, 533 (1984), that these sorts ofinterfereOCl'S with properly rights do not violate 
due process a.~ long a~ the state ha~ provided an adequate lXlst-deprlvation remedy. \Vhatever Us 
validity in the context of procedural due process. this exception has no applica tion to the Takings 
Clause. which is a suhstantive limitation on tile power of govemment. See Zinerlllol), 494 U.S. at 125 
{distinguishing procedural due process claims (i ncluding P«rrall) from claims against government 
orricials brought under either (i) those provisions of the Bill of Rights iocorporated into lhe Due 
Process Clause or (il) substantive due process). Moreover, regulatory takings are neither random nor 
unauthorized: they are deliberate official actions applying regulations to particular interests in propeny. 
94 See, e,g .. United SlateS v. 564.54 Acres of Land. 44 I U.S, 506, 508 (1979) (government offered 
$485.400 for land: owner rejected ofTer and deillanded $5.8 million). 
95 Under so·called "quick take" statutes in efTect in a 1lL1Jority of states. title to condemned properly 
can Ila'is to the government before the amount of Just compell~ation is finally determhled. See 6 Jc L tl i 
L SICtl!S .Nl tIO lS I I ~ 1!t I T Ol l!ll §24. IOI21(3ded .. rev.2014). But the eminent domain 
action is JlO! closed until the parties have settled or the cuun enters a filial judgment detennining the 
Il;quired amount of just compe rlS<ltion. See id. § 24.05111 ("Tille to the condemned land IJaSSCS when 
the mOrley Is paid .... "). 
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before the Takings Clause (or its state equivalent) can be said to have been 
violated . Given this implicit recognition in the context of eminent domain 
that the Constitution is violated when a property owner is offered 
inadequate compensation for a laking, one might expect thal the same 
conception about when a constitutional violation occurs would prevail in 
the regulatory takings context as well." From this perspective, Williamson 
County's second ripeness requiremelll seems less like an ineluctable 
deduction from the nature of the constitutional right and more like an 
overly rigid barrier to adjudication of regulatory takings claims in fede ral 
court. 
B. Jurisdiction and Sovereign immunity 
There is a second path to the A line, which has loomed larger in the 
Tucker Act decisions. The Tucker Act has been construed to mean that the 
CFC has exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate regulatory takings claims 
seeking more than $10,000 aga inst the United States. ' The Tucker Act has 
also been construed as a wa iver of sovereign immunity by the United 
States... In contrast, there is no general waiver of sovereign immunity for 
claims seeking "money damages" in federa l courts of general ju risdiction. 
From this it has seemed to fo llow that all takings claims for more than 
$10,000 must be brought in the CFe. 
Here. the starting point in the argument is va lid : given sovereign 
immunity, on ly a court designated by the sovereign as having authority to 
enter judgments requiring the sovereign to pay just compensation (such as 
the CFC under the Tucker Act) may do so. It does not necessarily follow, 
however, that courts of general jurisdiction have no authority to enter 
dec laratory judgments respecting takings claims. Given the compensatory 
nature of the constitutional right. courts of general jurisdiction ordinarily 
cannot el!Join takings of pIVperry. But they can enter anticipa tory decrees 
as to whether the government is requ ired to pay compensation for a taking 
of property. Given the creation of specia lized co mpensation cou rts where 
the government has wa ived its sovereign immunity. courts of general 
j urisd iction have no authority to enter j udgments requiring the government 
to pay compensation; any such order would always have to come from the 
compensation court. Bu t the determination of critical takings issues by a 
court of general jurisd iction - for example, by declara tory judgment -
would not yield a judgment requ iring the payment of compensation. It 
would function only to eliminate the need for any takings inqu iry in the 
compensation court , or at least to narrow the issues in controversy. 
96 Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc .. 544 U.s. 528. 539 (2005) (s!atlng that regu la!01Y !aklng occurs 
when the govenlluenl takes action "functionally equiva lent to the classic taking in which govemmem 
directly ~Ilpropfiates private property or ousts the owner from his domain"). 
97 See~'upr" nOlcs 48.51.7 1 . 
98 See United Stares v. Mitchell. 463 U.S. 206. 212- 14 (1983). 
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C. Anticipatory Remedies 
What then about anticipatory remedies for takings? For present 
purposes, I include in Ihis category any remedy other than a judgment 
requiring the government to pay just compensation , The princi pal remedy 
I have in mind is a declaratory judgment, authorized by the Declaratory 
Judgment Act of 1934, The Act provides that , subject to enumerated 
exceptions that do nol include lakings cla ims. a federal district court "may 
dec lare the righ ts and other legal relations of any interested party seeking 
such declaration, whether or not further reli ef is or could be sought. "" 
This aUlhori zation certainly would seem broad enough to include 
dec larations reso lving certain antecedent issues thai bear on whether the 
claimant is entitled to compensation, such as whether the Takings Clause 
applies to the government action in question, " whether the claimant has a 
"pri vale property" inlerest protected by the Tak ings Clause, " or whether 
certain categorical rules of liability or nonliability app ly. " 
I would also include with in the calegory of anticipatory remedies 
petitions fo r review of agency action, either under the agency's organic act 
or under the APA. in which a party claims that the agency's action violates 
the Tak ings Clause. Again, such a review process could not yield a 
judgmenl requiring the government 10 pay compensation, but it could 
resolve the antecedent question of whether the government action 
constitutes a taking. The Supreme Court's various decisions in the B line 
of authority, in which it granls certiorari from a lower federal or slate court 
dec ision in order to resolve important questions about the Takings Clause 
without requ iring prior adjudication in the compensation court, can also be 
viewed as a form of anticipatory relief. The Court in these cases does not 
order Ihe government to pay compensation, but reso lves Ihe legal issue and 
returns the case to the lower courts for further proceedings consistent with 
its decision. Finally, I would include decisions issuing iruunctions in this 
calegory. l'1junctions requiring the govenunent to pay compensation 
should be rare. given the alternative of a declaratory judgment and the 
principle that only the compensation courl can award compensation. But 
if a taking violates the public use requirement or transgresses the scope of 
the government' s legal authority, or if the government has refused or fail ed 
99 28 USc. § 2201 (a) (2012), 
100 For example. the Court lias assumed that the Takings Clause does nOI apply 10 exerc ises o f Ihe 
laxing power, KoonlZ v, SI. Johns River Water Mgrllt Dist , 133 S, Ct 2586. 2600-01 (2013) (c iting 
Brnwn v. Legal Found. of Wa.'ilL. 538 U.s. 216. 243 n.2 (2003) (5<:a lia.1.. dissentlng)). 
101 £.g .. Phillips v, Wash. Legal Found" 524 U.S. 156 (1 998) (considering whether interest 011 fund 
held by lawyer for ciiell ts was prnperty of the diem for takillgs purposes). 
102 £.g .. Yee v. CHy of Escondido, 503 U.s. 519, 527 (1992) (concluding lhal renl conl ro l schell lC 
coupled wUh statute allowing tenant to selecl a sucCe$.'iOr did not fall wUhin the ca tegory of permanent 
physical ocr.upatlotl~ that always require comperl'kl.tlon). For a discussion of cmegorlcal rules of 
takings liability and non liability. see D1l \ & M E I I I L L • supra note 40. al 86- 120. 
103 An injunct ion ordering the payment of compensat ion might be approp ri~te if ~ compensation 
courl delermiBed Ille al1lounl of compensation owed bUI declined to award compensation for a reason 
Ihe reviewing court delermhll'd 10 he lega lly unsuppol1ed, 
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to pay compensation, an inj unction against the taking of the property 
would be warranted . ' 
Two preliminary observations about these anticipatory remedies are 
appropriate. First, anticipatory adjudication can never occur unless basic 
j usticiability prerequisites are satisfied . The claimant must have standing, 
the controversy must be ripe, the issues cannot be moot, and the court 
cannot render an advisory opinion. As the Supreme Court has explained in 
the comext of declaratory judgments, there must be "a substantial 
controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient 
immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory 
j udgmenl. ";" The same of course holds fo r other modes of anticipatory 
relief. whether it be a petition for review under the APA, the Supreme 
Court's exercise of certiorari authority, or an action for equitable relief. 
Second , all forms of anticipatory relief are discretional)', in the sense 
that the court has significant discretion, based on the circumstances 
presented, either to grant or withhold the requested relief. With respect to 
the Declaratory Judgment Act, fo r example, the Court has said that the Act 
provided an additional "remedial arrow in the district court's quiver: it 
created an opportunity, rather than a duty, to grant a new form of relief to 
qualifying litigants." Accordingly. "the normal principle that federal 
courts should adjudicate claims within their jurisdiction yields to 
considerations of practicality and wise judicial administration. ~ ," Whether 
a court takes up or rejects the request for anticipatory relief. the standard 
of review on appeal is abuse of discretion. " Similar discretion should be 
exercised by courts reviewing agency action, such that they should decline 
to consider the takings issue if considerations of judicial economy would 
favor leaving it up to the compensation court. Clearly. the Supreme Court 
exercises enormous discretion in deciding whether to grant review to 
consider takings issues in the cases presented to them on certiorari. And 
equitable remed ies are always understood to be discretionary rather than 
mandatoI)'. 
Jurisdiction should pose no barrier to such actions. If the second 
Williamson County ripeness requirement were understood to rest on the 
case or controversy language of Article Ill, then courts would lack subject 
matter jurisdiction over any form of anticipatory adjudication. This 
interpretation would foreclose any use of the Declaratory Judgment Act to 
resolve takings controversies, since the Act does not confer jurisdiction; it 
only allows federal courts to use a different type of remedy - the 
declaratory judgment - when this remedy would be useful in resolving a 
legal controversy.'" There is no indication, however, that Williamson 
104 See ~'upr" lIOie 1 4. 
!OS Medirnrnunc. 111(. v. Genemech. 1n(., 549 U.s. 118, 127 (2007) (quilling Md. Cas. Co. v. Pac. 
Cool &. au Co .. 312 u.s. 270. 273 (1941)) (hucmal qUlllalion mark omined). 
106 Wilton v. Seven Falls Co .. 515 U.s. 277. 288 (1 995). 
107 Id. 
108 Id. al 289. 
109 See 28 USC. § 220\(.1) (20 12) (providing aUlhorily for a fedcml courl 10 Issue declamlory 
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County's second ripeness requirement rests on Article III considerations, as 
opposed to an inference (erroneously) drawn from the nature of the 
constitutional right. " In any event, the Court has recently characterized 
Williamson County's second ripeness requirement as "prudential," and 
has said "it is not, strictly speaking, j urisdictional. " " This characterization 
opens the door to using the Declaratory Judgment Act as a vehicle for 
obtaining anticipatory relief in takings cases, assuming a court concludes it 
is appropriate to exercise this authority. 
Nor should sovereign immunity present a serious barrier to an 
anticipatory action. With respect to regulatory takings by the federal 
government, the sovereign immunity barrier is overcome by the 
Administrative Procedure Act, which waives immunity for actions against 
the United States "seeking relief other tllan money damages." " An action 
seeking a declaration that the government is engaged in a taking that 
would require the payment of money damages is not an action seeking 
money damages. This is because the government could avoid the 
obligation to compensate by desisting from or modifying its action in ways 
that would eli minate the taking. In effect, a declaratory judgment finding 
a taking would create an option (or options) in the government: desist, 
modi ty, or pay. And given the limited nature of the federal government's 
waiver of sovereign immunity in the Tucker Act, any action actually to 
collect such money would typically have to be filed in the CFC. With 
respect to state takings, the sovereign immunity barrier to seeking 
declaratory relief against the states would be surmounted by relying on the 
officer suit procedure of Ex parte Young. Local governments do not enjoy 
sovereign immunity and can be sued directly for takings violations under 
42 USc. § 1983. 
Another question sometimes ra ised about declaratory judgments is 
whether they are binding as a matter of res judicata in later controversies 
judgments in cases "of actual cont roversy wiriJill irs jurisdiClioll" (emphasis added)): Skelly Oil Co. v. 
Phillips PetroL Co .. 339 U.s. 667, 671 (l950) ("Collgress enlar&'Cd the range of renlL'{lies available in 
dn~ federal cuurts bUI did not extend dlei r jurisdiction:). 
110 Nor is there any indication that WiIIiil1ll'iOIl Cou{I(Y's First ripeness requirement - tlMt the 
regulatory authority nHL~1 have reached a I1IMl dcci~lon about the app llcalion of Its regulat ion to the 
owner's proposed development - was based 011 Article [JJ considerations, See WiUiamson Cllly. Reg'l 
Planning Connn'n v. Hamiltun Bank, 473 U.s , 172, 186- 94 (1985) {deriving the reljuirement by 
genera li l ing From precedent involving takings challenges}. Ripeness is, however, a !L'<:luirement of 
Article III, see United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 89 (l947), arld tllis would obviously limit 
tile ~utllority of federal COUrl~ to ~wanl anticipatory rcllef where tile controversy i~ hL~uffiden tly 
crystalized to sustain ajudicial resolution. 
111 Hume v. Dep'! of Agric .. 133 S , Ct. 2053. 2062 (20 13) (quot ing LuCils v. S,C. Coastal Council. 
505 U.s. 1003. 101 3 (l992)) (internal quotation Illark omilled). 
112 /d. (clrlngSlop tile Beacll Renourishmeru. lnc. v. Fla. Dep' t of EllIltl. Pmt., 130 S. Ct. 2592. 26 10 
& n.I O (2010) UlluralUy 0llinlon)). 
113 Cf. Hawley, supra note 14 , at 251 (describing flo/JIe as "die Court's fim acknowledgment, however 
oblique. dlilt ,lilat Williamson CouJlly called ripeness lIIay in Fact be a question of remedies"). 
114 5 u.s.c. § 702 (20 12). 
11 5 Monell v. Dep 'I of Soc. Servs .. 436 U.S. 658. 663 (1978). 
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before other courts. The best view is probably thal whether or not it has 
full res judicata effect a declaratory j udgment has issue-preclusion effects, 
at least between the parties. A principal reason for limiting preclusion to 
issues rather than claims is that the conduct of the parties may have 
changed between the issuance of the declaratory judgment and any 
enforcement action. " This makes particular sense in the takings contexl. 
One nOl-unlikely effect of a declaratory judgment finding takings liability 
is that the government will modify its regulation to eliminate or reduce the 
features that make it a laking. One would certainly expect such a 
modification to be taken into account in any later action in the 
compensation court seeking money damages. That said, there is nothing 
in the language of the Declaratory Judgmem Act to suggest that decisions 
rendered under the Act are not entitled to full issue-preclusive effect in the 
compensation court. The Act says that such judgmenlS "shall have the 
force and effect of a final judgment," ,,, and specifically provides tllat 
"(f]urther necessary or proper relief based on a declaratory judgment or 
decree may be granted, after reasonable notice and hearing, against any 
adverse party whose rights have been determined by such judgment. " . 
This language implies that the failu re of a party to comply with a 
declaratory judgmem can be fo llowed up by an injunction requiring 
compliance. 
To illustrate how anticipatory adjudication might operate in takings 
cases, assume that a s tate government enaclS a s tatute that eliminates a 
tradilional attribute of private property, such as the right to exclude 
strangers from entering unenclosed land to engage in recreational 
activities. " An owner of unenclosed rural land objeclS to the statute and 
believes it is a taking of property wilhoutjust compensation in violation of 
the federal constitution. Using the officer suit mechanism of Ex parte 
Young, the landowner could file an action in federal district court seeking a 
declaration that the s tate statute constitutes a taking requiring the payment 
11 6 Steffel v. 17wmpsol!. 415 U.s. 452 {1974}. revea ls some disagreement about the res judicata effect 
of a federal declal"3tory judgment in subS\.'quelit Slate criminal procl't-'llings. Compare id, at 476- 78 
{White. J .. concurring} {concluding declardtory judgment ',','Quld lJe resjudicam}. witil id. at 480- 82 & 
n.3 {RelmquiSI, J.. COllcurring} {exprCSS iTlg doubts}. 
11 7 SceSamuel L Bray, Prr:,·(:fJli.-eAlljudicmioll. 77 U. Cil . L RE I . 1275. 1293 {20tO}. 
118 See id. at 1295. 
119 Even if the govelllment drops the regulation. the owner might have an action for compensation 
based on lost development value during the time the n::gulation was in e ffect. See First English 
Evangelical t utheran Church v. Cnty. o f Los Angell'S, 482 U.s. 304 (J987) (recognizing a right to 
compell';iHlnn fnr temporary regulatory takings). 
120 28 U.s.c. § 2201(a) (201 2). 
121 {d. § 2202. 
122 Many Statcs have sought to encourage oWllers 10 allow recreational USCS on urlCnclosed land by 
legislating Immunity fmm tort suits relall'd to such uses. Sec Bragg V. Genesee Cnty. Agric. Soc"y. 644 
N.E.2d 1013. l0i 7- 18 (N.Y. 1994): Comment, Wiscon~in:~ Recf'('a/ional U~e Statule: TowarriI 
SharpeJlillg /lie Picture at the Edges. 199 1 WI! . L RE \ . 491. 495- 508. And many statcs require 
owners 10 post unenc1OSl-'ll land if they wish to exclude hUJIters. See Mark R, Sigmon. Huming and 
POStillg 011 PriV'dle Lmd ill AmeriCil, 54 Il. [I LJ. 549. 558- 68 (2004). My hypothetical statute would 
go fu nher by abrogatIng the right to exclude any recreational usc. 
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of just compensation. The federal court would have jurisdiction to 
entertain the action under 28 USc. § 1331. If the court concluded the 
statute caused a taking. it would have authority under the Declaratory 
Judgment Act to enter a decree to that effect. Armed with such a 
judgment, the claimant should be able to demand , in an appropriate state 
court, that the state either modify its law or pay compensation for the 
taking. Such an adjudication would not go beyond the limited right 
created by the Takings Clause because the court would not enjoin 
enforcement of the statute, but would only declare that the plaintiff is 
entitled to j ust compensation because of the enactment of the statute. And 
it would not transgress sovereign immunity, because it would only declare 
that the plaintiff is entitled to compensation: it would not actually order the 
state to compensate. 
IV. T~ [ N Oill.AIIYE Gi SE rOi A~I[CI ' AIOir RI MEDI!S 
Just because we can fashion a doctrinal argument that would reconci le 
the B line decisions with the constitutional princip les the Court has cited in 
support of the A line decisions, it does not follow, of cou rse, that 
anticipatory relief should be allowed. It is always possible that even if the 
Court's reasons for endorsing the A line are not dispositi ve, the position 
staked out in those decisions is nevertheless correct on policy grounds. In 
order to assess that question , I propose to proceed inductively rather than 
deductively. Spec ifical ly, I will consider whether it made sense to endorse 
the B line rather than the A line in the three recent decisions in which the 
Supreme Court did so, and if so why. I will then consider three other 
controversies that have recently arisen in which some kind of anticipatory 
remedy for an alleged takings vio lation wou ld seem highly advantageous. 
An examination of these spec ific data points shou ld anchor a consideration 
of the normative arguments for permitting anticipatory remedies for 
takings, as well as inform questions about what sort of limits shou ld be 
imposed on the availability of such relief. 
A. Three Recent Supreme Court Decisions 
As previously noted . in three of its most recent takings decisions the 
Supreme Court has implicitly adopted the B line of authority, which in turn 
presupposes that some forms of anticipatory relief are available for 
takings. 
Stop the Beach Renollrishmem, inc. Y. Florida Deparcment of 
EnYiroflllJema/ Protection , presented the novel and highly contested 
question whether "judicial takings" are actionable under the Takings 
Clause. Several Florida beachfront landowners sought to halt a local 
government project designed to reSlOre eroded shoreline. The landowners 
claimed that the project would result in Significant amounts of dry sand 
being deposited seaward on their properly. They argued that this was a 
123 130 S. CI. 2592 (20 10). 
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taking of their riparian rights to future accretions and to have their land 
louch the waler. When the stale supreme court ruled that neither of the 
claimed rights was secured by Florida law, the landowners sought and 
secured further review by the U.S. Supreme Court to consider the claim 
that the Slate court's interpretation of Slate law was itself a "judicial 
laking. " 
The Court unanimously concluded thaI the Florida Supreme Court, in 
the j udgment under review, had not committed a judicial taking .. " 
However, the Justices split 4-4 on whether it was necessary to delineate 
the elements that would have to be present in order to conclude that there 
had been a judicial taking. . In a concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy 
cited "certain difficult questions~ · raised by the idea of j udicial takings, 
one of which was how they would be remedied. ·' He began by noting: "It 
appears under our precedents that a party who suffers a taking is only 
entitled to damages, not equitable relief . . .. ",,, The idea of judicial 
takings, he continued , appeared to contemplate that "reviewing courts 
could invalidate judicial decisions deemed to be judicial takings. ",,, justice 
Kennedy was worried about how this would work: "rWJhere Case A 
changes the law and Case B addresses whether that change is a taking. it is 
not clear how the Court, in Case B, could invalidate the holding of Case 
A." 
j ustice Scalia, who wrote for four justices in support of recognizing 
j udicial takings, responded to the "difficult questionrr raised by justice 
Kennedy about remedies. His response is quite puzzling, so I quote it in 
full : 
Justice KENNEDY worries that we may only be able to mandate 
compensation. That remedy is even rare for a legislati ve or executive taking. 
and we see no reason why it would be (he exclusive remedy for a judicial 
(aking. If we were to hold (ha( the Florida Supreme Court had effected an 
uncompensated taking in (he presellf case. we would simply reverse (he 
Florida Supreme Court's judgment that the Beach and Shore Preservation Act 
can be applied to the property in question. 
The notion that requiring compensation is "rare" for legislative and 
executive takings is baffling. As previously discussed . the Court has 
frequently said that the only substantive right created by the Takings 
Clause is the right to compensation when property is taken, and the Court 
has often declined to consider takings claims when the option of seeking 
compensation remains open (the A line cases). justice Kennedy cited some 
124 /d. at 2610- 13. 
125 See !d, at 2602. 2604. 
126 /d. ar 26 15 (Kennedy. J. . concurrIng In parr and concurring in rhejudgmenr). 




13 1 /d. ar 2607 U11uraliryopinion). 
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of these authorities, . and Justice Scalia did not acknowledge or try to 
distinguish them. 
Justice Scalia was on stronger ground in asserting without elaboration 
that he saw "no reason why" compensation should be the "exclusive 
remedy" for a taking. As we have seen, there is no constitutional reason 
why courts shou ld not be able to enter anticipatory relief in takings cases. 
The better response to Justice Kennedy's worries about remedies would 
have been that a federal court, including the Supreme Court. should be 
able to enter a declaratory judgment as to whether a court has committed a 
judicial taking. Indeed , thiS is precisely what the Court did : it declared -
unanimously - that the Florida Supreme Court had not committed a 
judicial taking in the decision under review. 
What if the decision had gone the other way? If the Court had issued a 
declaration that the Florida Supreme Court had committed a judicial 
taking, the state would then have a number of options. One would be to 
pay compensation in order to secure the change in property law effectuated 
by its supreme court's ruling. Another would be to amend the law to 
eliminate the legal change deemed to be a judicial taking (for example, 
restore the property right eliminated by the court that committed the 
judicial taking). A third might be to modify the project that gave rise to 
the controversy in the first place, so as to eliminate the need to compensate 
the immediate claimants for a j udicial taking. " In effect, a declaratory 
ruling about the state's liability to compensate for the judicial taking would 
create a number of options for the state, only one of which would be to 
pay compensation to the claimant. 
If the Supreme Court is going to recognize judicial takings (still an 
open question) , some kind of declaratory remedy would seem to be 
necessary. The alternative of forcing the claimant to file an action in state 
court seeking compensation would be to compel the performance of a 
futile act. No state trial court or intermed iate appellate court is going to 
hold that the state supreme court committed a judicial taking, nor is the 
state supreme court going to rule against itself (unless perhaps there has 
been an intervening change in court personnel) . So requiring the claimant 
to show that she has sought and been denied compensation by the state (as 
the A line requires) wou ld be to command fru itless litigation having no 
benefit in terms of moving tlle controversy toward a resolution. 
Moreover, the decision that perpetrates the alleged judicial taking is likely 
132 /d. ~t 2617 (Kennedy. J.. concurring in part ;UKI concurring in the judgment) (ching RuckeJslmu.>, 
Firs.f English: ~l1d Williamson Coum)1. 
133 fd. at 2607 (plurali ty opinion). 
134 In olher words, 111001 the case. It is conceivable Ihal oil Ier OWrlCl'5, c<:[ually afTccled by the 
judicial taking, might have standing to c1~lllenge the change In properly law and seek cornpelL';aHon. 
using the deciSion of the reviewing courl a.~ a foundation for lhe claim. 
135 Cf. E. Emers. v. ApfeL 524 U.s. 498, 521 - 22 (1998) (plura1ilyopinion) (grarning equitable relief 
when a suit for morlela!), relief in the CFC ' would email an ullerly poimiesssetofactivities."id.al 
52 1 {quoting Sludeol wan Mklg. Ass 'n v. Riley, 104 F.:kI 397, 401 (D.C. (ir. 1997)) (internal 
quotation n~lrk omitted)). 
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to create uncertainty about the rights of similarly situated property owners, 
and postponing further inquiry into the constitutionality of the decision is 
likely La cause many owners to take action or decline to take action wilh 
respect to their property in ways that cannot later be undone. 
Horne v. Department of Agriculture. " the second decision about 
remedies, expressly rejected the government's Tucker Act defense in a case 
involving a raisin handler who challenged as a taking a fine levied against 
him under the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 (AMAA). 
The Act requires handlers of raisins to reserve a portion of the raisins they 
process, typically for school lunch programs and the like. ' The objective 
is to restrict the supply of raisins and hence to support prices. " If handlers 
fail to comply, the Act allows the Depaflment of Agriculture to levy heavy 
fines against them. ', Handlers who are aggrieved can seek review of any 
order imposing a fine by filing a petition for review in the federal courts of 
general jurisdiction. " The Homes refused to reserve any raisins, claiming 
that they were "producers" rather than "handlers" under the Act. and hence 
they were not subject to mandatory set-asides of raisins imposed by the 
Act. " After the Department found that the Homes were handlers and 
imposed a stiff fine on them for violating the Act, they filed a petition for 
review challenging this order. " The district court and the Nilllh Circuit 
both affirmed the finding that the Homes were handlers, and the Supreme 
COUfl, for its part, readily agreed. " 
Having rejected the Homes' administrative law defense that they were 
producers rather than handlers, did the court have authority to conSider the 
takings defense? The Ninth Circuit concluded that it did not. ,; Once the 
Homes lost on their APA claim, the only way they could adjudicate the 
takings claim was to pay the fine and file suit in the CFC seeking to 
recover the fine as a taking. " 
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed. , The Court found that the 
AMAA established a "comprehensive remedial scheme" that implicitly 
withdrew Tucker Act jurisdiction over a handler's challenge to an 
enforcemelll order. " Given that the Tucker Act remedy was foreclosed , 
the Court held that the Homes were free to raise the constitutional defense 
on judicial review of the enforcement order in the courts of general 
136 133 S. CI. 2053 (201 3). 
137 Pub. L. No. 73-10. 50 Slat 246 (codif"jed in scallc rcd Srtlions of 7 U.s.c.). 
138 Home. 133 S. 0. al 2057- 58. 
139 /d. ar 2056- 57. 
140 See!d. ar 2056. 
111 See!d. 
142 /d. al 2058- 59. 
143 /d. ar 2056. 
144 Id. ar 2060. 
145 Home v. U.S. Dep 't of Agric .. 673 F.3d 107 1. 1079- 80 (91h Cif. 20 12). 
116 Id. 
147 110mI'. 133 S. CI. al 2056. 
148 /d. ar 2062. 
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j urisdiction. .. The Court did not suggest that the reviewing courl, if it 
found the marketing order was a taking, had authority to grant an award of 
compens ation. The statute in question refers to the reviewing court as 
exercising ''j urisdiction in equity" and contains no hint of any authority to 
award damages. " Presumably, therefore, the remedy for any taking found 
by the reviewing court would be a judgment invalidating the enforcement 
order. Horne thus joins the B line of cases. " 
Although Horne is limited by its terms to the remedies available under 
the AMAA. one feature of the opinion is more broadly relevant to our 
topic, and will undoubtedly raise iLS head in the future. In reaching the 
conclusion that the Act had implicitly withdrawn a Tucker Act remedy, the 
Court went out of iLS way to explain why Williamson County did not 
require a contrary result. " The Court characterized Williamson County's 
second ripeness rule - requiring that takings claims be presented to and 
denied by state courts before federal courLS may intervene - as being only 
a "prudential" requirement ' rather than a "jurisdictional'" one. ' It is 
unclear what the Court meant by "prudential " in this context, or what 
bearing this characterization had on the displacement of the Tucker Act 
remedy. The Court immediately acknowledged that claims for j ust 
compensation against the federal government must be brought in the CFC 
"unless Congress has withdrawn the Tucker Act grant of j urisdiction in the 
149 'd. at 206:.1- 64. 
150 7 USC. § 60&( 15)(8) (2012). 
151 TIle Court may have resolved tile case thL~ way hecal1'>e the govemment took the posillon tlMt the 
AMAA was the exclusive remedy for seeking review of a markeling order. and that therefore the 
Tucker Act remedy was forecJoSl.'<i. See Brief for the Respom.lent at 17- 18. Home. 13:.1 S. CI. 2053 
(No. 12- 123). 2013 WI. 543625. Given prccedellts holdillg that withdrawals of the Tucker Act remedy 
are disfavored. see. e.g.. Preseauit v. ICC. 494 U.S. L 12 (1990) (requiring an "unambiguous !menllon 
to wilhdraw the Tucker Act remedy" (quOling Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co .. 467 U.s. 986. 1019 
(1984)) (internal qUOIation marks omined)): Reg'l Rail Reorg. Act Cases. 419 U.s. 102. 133 (1974) 
(holding that when a later statute is "ambiguous on the question ' wlletiler a Tucker Act renJ(.oUy is 
availalJle. "applicable caoOllS of SIal utory cOllstnlctioll require' the concluSion that the remedy has lIot 
Ileen withdrawn). and given the complete absence of any reference 10 takings cl~hll~ in the AMAA. the 
more plallSible position would have been that the AMAA did 1101 withdraw the Tocker Act remedy. If 
accepted by the Coun. this cou Id have IL>.:! 10 a straightfo[\\'ard affinnance of the Nimh Circuit dt.'Cision. 
instead. h~\'ing ~rgued tila! the Tucker Act remedy was nOl a\'a ilable. tile Solicitor Genera l abo argued 
(although admitting thc issue was "close") that the I~kings issue could not be ra ised on judicial review 
either. Brief for the Reslxmdent . supr~. M 50. In effect , the govemment seemed to be sayIng that the 
takings claim was unreviewable by any court. TIlis was presumably too much for tile Courl. How tile 
Coun would ha\'e mIL>.:! if the go\'cllltliem had I~ken the poSition th~t the Tucker Act renlloUY WdS 
a\'~ilable is hard to say. 
152 Wil/iam~' 'OIl Coumy invol \'{~d taki llgs cla ims brought ~gai llst state govem!llent actors. not federal 
agencIes. But tile government relied ext{,]L~ ively on Wil/iamSQJ! Couilly In its brief as the leading ca.'ie 
establishing a general requirement that t~kings claims must be ripened in tile appropri~te court of 
spI-'Cia l jurisdiction before they tlIay be raised in a coun of gelleral jurisdiction. Brief for the 
Respondent supr" lIote 151. at 21- 25. 
153 Home. 133 S. CL at 2062 (quot ing Luca.~ v. S.c. Coast~1 Councl!' 505 U.S. 1003. 1013 (1992)) 
{lntenMI quotation mark omlttedl . 
154 /d. (citing Stop the Beach Reoourishment. Inc. v. Fla. Dep' t of Envtl . Prot.. 130 S. CI. 2592. 2610 
& n.l 0 (20 I 0) (plurdlity ollinioll)). 
155 As we have seen. this dictum helllS open the door to [)eclamtory Judgmell t Act suits. whether thiS 
was intended or rIOt. See supra p. 1652. 
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relevant statute ." In other words, the Tucker Act is jurisdictional. 
Like Justice Scalia's plurality opinion in Slop the Beach, Justice 
Thomas's opinion in Home would have been more persuasive if he had 
simply recognized that the case was one in which anticipatory review of 
the takings issue by a court of general j urisdiction was appropriate. 
Anticipatory review in this context saves the petitioners from having to 
split their defense into two parts and litigating in two different forums. 
Although the question is closer than the one in SlOp the Beach, where 
mandating a trip to the compensation court would be futile, the procedure 
contemplated by the Ninth Circuit would unquestionably be duplicative 
and burdensome. Moreover, given that the takings claim was based on the 
same operative facts as the APA claim, and the APA action was filed first , 
there is authority suggesting thai the CFC could not consider the takings 
claim as long as the APA challenge remained pending. This raised the 
risk that the takings claim would be barred by the statute of limitations. 
Some would find the waste and duplication involved in splitting the review 
process into two parts, and having them conSidered by two different courts, 
sufficient reason to warrant anticipatory review. If one includes the risk of 
losing the claim for compensation ahogether, the case for anticipatory 
relief becomes even stronger. Certainly, allowing the Ninth Circuit to 
conSider the takings claim would promise a less circuitous resolution of 
the controversy. As it happened, the Court sent the case back to the Ninth 
Circuit for consideration of the takings defense, where it was rejected, 
prompting the Court to grant review again .- " Whether allowing 
anticipatory relief in this particular case would spare the parties (and the 
j udiciary) the need to process a second suit in the CFC remains to be seen, 
although that will be the effect if the Hornes ' takings claim is ultimately 
rejected. 
Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District, " the third 
decision, presented an especially knotty version of the remedial problem. 
Koontz owned undeveloped land in Florida . He applied for permits to 
develop a portion of the land under Florida statutes requiring permits for 
building on wetlands. The local authority said the permits would issue 
only if Koontz agreed to pay for enhancement of wetlands on government-
owned property several miles away. Koontz rejected the deal and filed su it 
156 Home. 133 S. O . ~t 2oo2 (qUOting E. En ters. v. Apfel. 521 U.S. 498. 520 (1998) (plur~lity 
opinion)) (intemal quotation nl(lrk omitted). 
157 A federal statute initially adopted in 1868.28 U.s.e. § 1500. deprives the CFC of j urisdiction 
when a plaintiff has a re lated "claim" pending In another (nurt. The Supreme Court has COll~trued 
"claim" very broadly to mean any action arising out of the same "operative facts " wi thout regard to the 
relief that is sought. See United Stales v. Tollollo O'Odham Nation. 131 S. CI. 17Z3. l728 (201l). 
TIIUS. if an action seeking relief under administralive law is filed in a cou rl o f general jurisdiction. and 
only IMer Is an a( tlon for j ust compem;atlon filed in rhe CFe. rhe CFC acrion musr be dL~mlssed . Once 
the adminlstrarive law ac tlnn i~ concluded. an acrion in rhe CFC can he (ommenced. provided "rhe 
sta rute of limirarions is no bar." Jd. at 1731. 
158 Home v. Dep'r of Agric .. 750 F.3d 11 28. 1132 (9th Cir. 2014). (en. gramed. 83 U.5.L.W. 31Z7 
(U.S. Jan. 16. 201 5) (No. 14-275). 
159 133 S. Cr. 258fi (20 13). 
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in state court alleging that the proposed condition was an exaction that 
violated the "nexus" and "rough proportionality" requirements of the U.S. 
Supreme Court's decisions in Nol/an " and Dolan. The Florida Supreme 
Court rejected the claim, reasoning in part that because Koontz had refused 
the deal, there was no exaction, and hence no taking of his property. " In 
effect, the Florida court held that Koontz would have to accept the permit, 
pay the demanded exaction, and then challenge the exaction as a taking for 
which he was entitled to just compensation. In other words, the Florida 
court adopted a version of the A line position. 
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, , and it was unanimous in rejecting 
the Florida court's conclusion that there was no issue under the Takings 
Clause if the exaction was declined. The opinion for the Court by 
Justice Alito, was less than clear as to why a court has authority to police 
exactions under the Takings Clause if there is no exaction and hence no 
taking. As ] read the opinion, the Court held that the Takings Clause not 
only prohibits takings of property without compensation, but also prohibits 
certain government threats to take property without compensation. " The 
Court analogized the local government 's proposed deal with Koontz to 
extortion, of the your-money-or-your-life variety. Such threats are 
unlawful whether or not anyone's money or life is taken. Similarly, the 
Court reasoned, propositions of the form "your money or your 
development rights" should be subject to judicial scrutiny under NolJan 
and Dolan, even if no property or money changes hands. " Such deals are 
not always impermissible, but the government must show that there is a 
nexus between the property or money demanded and the proposed 
development, and that the value of the property or money extracted is 
160 NoHan v. Cal. Coastal Comm 'n. 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (holding that there must be an 
"essential IIexus" between an exaction and the "justifica tion for the prohibit ion" on deve lopment that 
.... uuld allpJy absent the exaction). 
161 Dolan v. City of Tigard. 512 U.s. 374, 391 (1994) (holding thai the va lue of exact ion !IIust be 
roughly proportional to an tklpated harms from the proposed development). 
162 SI. j ohns River Water Mgrnt. Dist. v. Koontz. 77 So. 3d J220, J230 (Fla. 2011). 
163 fd. Olokling titat Nollan and Dolan apply ·only when tite regulatory a~,'ellcy actually issues the 
permit sought. thereby rendering the owner's interLost in the real property subject to the dedication 
imposed "). 
164 KooIJIz. 133 S. C1. at 259 1. 
165 See!d. al 2603 (Kagan. j .. dissenting) ("I th ink the Court gets the first question it addresses right. 
... H ie Nollan-Dofan standard applies not only when the govemrnent apllroves a development pennit 
conditioned onlhe owoer's cooveyance of a properly interest ... but also when the governmcnt den ies 
a permit untillhe OWrlCr mccts Ihe coodition .... "). 
166 See irl. at 2596 (n~"!i ority opinion) (" Exto[tlonate demands for property in the lal KI ·use pennitting 
context run afoul of the Takings Clause not because they take properly but because they impemlissibly 
burden the right IlOr to have property taken without just compensation."). 
167 See id. al 2594- 95 (re ferriog to cxactions as a "type of coercion," 'prcssur[illg] an owner into 
voluntari ly giving up property for which the FIfth Amendment lVould othenvLo;e require just 
colUllCll'>J.tioll. " and potentially - [ejxtort iollille"): id. at 2595 ("I R Jeganlless of whether rhe govelllment 
ultimately succeeds in pressuring someone into forfeiting a constilUtional right. the unconstilUlional 
conditions tIoct rine forbids burdening the Constitution' s ellumerdll'd rights by coercively withholding 
benefi ts from Ihose who exercise the m. "j. 
168 See it!. at 2595. 
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roughly proportionate to social costs imposed by the proposed 
development. 
Once the Court decided that the Takings Clause prohibits certain 
threats to take property withoul j ust compensation. it would seem that the 
appropriate remedy would be an anticipatory adjudication like a 
declaratory judgment action. Forcing a landowner to choose between 
giving up on development rights or paying an exaction and suing to get it 
back is precisely the kind of dilemma the Declaratory Judgment Act was 
designed to resolve through an anticipatory declaration of rights.", The 
Court nevertheless drew back from drawing this conclusion. Justice Alita 
repeated the adage that "the Fifth Amendment mandates a particular 
remedy - just compensation - only for takings." " He then expressed 
agnosticism about whether Koontz would have any remedy for the 
threatened exaction if he could show that it violated Nollan or Dolan, 
stating that "whether money damages are available is not a question of 
federal constitutional law but of the cause of action - whether state or 
federal - on which the landowner relies." Declaratory relief had not 
been sought by Koontz, and given the posture of the case, it would seem 
that such relief was not possible. " But it would have been far more 
clarifying to acknowledge that anticipatory relief is potentially appropriate 
when the government threatens to commit a taking without compensation. 
Indeed, the only logical remedy for government threats of fu ture violations 
of constitutional rights is anticipatory relief. 
Allowing property owners to secure declaratory relief in these 
circumstances would also be SOCially deSirable. The process contemplated 
by the Florida Supreme Court - requiring the property owner to submit to 
the exaction and sue for compensation - would frequently resu lt in a 
change in the use of the property that could not be undone. Assuming (as 
did the majority but not the dissent) that the government has put a 
suffiCiently final offer on the table, the Florida court's position puts a 
property owner who thinks the exaction is excessive in a difficult bind. If 
the exaction is rejected, permission to develop is denied , and there is no 
avenue for seeking compensation because there is no taking. If the 
169 As the Court has observed. in a declaratory judgment action no less. "where threatened action by 
gOl"cl1Jlllmll is concerned. we do nnt require a plain tiff TO expose himself TO HabHity before hringing suit 
to challenge the hasis for the threat - for example. the constitutionality of a law threatened to be 
enforced: Medinl!1lUne. Inc. v. Genentech. Inc .. 519 US. 118. 128- 29 {2oo7j. 
170 Koof!/z. 1:.\3 S. Cl.atl597. 
171 fd. 
172 A complication in KooJllz not mentlnned hy the Coun was rhat the government had ulrin ~llely 
relented on requiring any exaction. See PeTitioner's Reply Brief at 5. KootJ(z. 133. S. CI. 2586 {No. 11 -
1117).2013 WL 98691. TIIus. the only cO listirutional violation that could be found on remand was for 
~n exaction thai lwl heell threatened in the llast bul Ihell dropped - and the only available remedy was 
compen.'iatlon for a temporary threatened exaction. Whether compensatlon was ava!lahle in these 
circunl~tances was pmh.lhly too difficult a question to consider without healing nrsl fmm rhe state 
COUTts. 
173 Compare Koolllz. 133 S. Ct. at 2598 (declaring thaI issue was not presented by peTition for 
cerliorali). wilh id. al 2609- 11 (Kagan. J .. dissenting) (arguing Ihal Florida diSt rict never made a 
"demarKI" thaI Koontz give up anything). 
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exaction is accepted , valuable property must be handed over to the 
government, and it will presumably be put to uses dictated by the 
government in a fashion that cannot be reversed. To be sure, acceptance 
would give rise to a right of action in the appropriate state court for 
compensation if the owner can show the exaction violates NolJan or 
Dolan. But the owner may not be able to afford having this capital (the 
future compensation fo r the exaction) tied up in litigation for years. Either 
way, the threat is likely to mean that property rights will be affected in 
ways that are impossible to unscramble. Allowing the validity of the 
threatened exaction to be resolved by declaratory order would resolve 
these uncertainties in a more timely manner, which in turn would allow the 
parties to move more quickly to a reso lution about whether or in what 
form the proposed development would be allowed to proceed. 
In sum, the three recent Supreme Court cases suggest that anticipatory 
remedies for takings may be useful when the alternative would result in (I) 
futile litigation ; (2) duplicative litigation; or (3) legal uncertainty that could 
have an undeSirable effect on deCisions about the development of property. 
B. Three Emerging Controversies 
Consideration of whether antiCi patory remedies might be desirable can 
be amplified by noting three other controversies about the Taki ngs Clause 
likely to emerge in the near future , each of which could easily give rise to 
a situation in which guidance in the fo rm of an anticipatory ruling about 
the scope of the Takings Clause could be of significant value. 
The first concerns municipal bankruptcy proceedings, such as the 
Detroit bankruptcy and those involving several cities in California. " A 
critical question in such cases is whether vested and fully funded public 
penSion obligations can be restructured by the bankruptcy court so as to 
reduce payments relative to the level promised in the releva nt penSion 
agreements. " The pension recipients have claimed that vested and fully 
funded pension obligations are analogous to security interests, and as such 
have priority over unsecured creditor rights in bankruptcy. One argument 
in support of this position is that such pension obligations are "private 
property" protected by the Takings Clause , and that any order by a 
bankruptcy judge authorizing reduction of these obligations would be a 
taking. In effect , this is a va riation on the judicial takings question: would 
a decision by a federal bankruptcy judge to require a reduction in vested 
and fully funded pension rights be a taking? In opposition, other creditors 
have maintained that such pensions are merely unsecured executory 
contracts subject to modification in bankruptcy. 
Should a bankruptcy judge in such a case avoid ruling on the takings 
issue, on the ground that if the pension rights are property, any taking of 
those rights can be remed ied by a suit agai nst the United States for just 
174 See generally Oavid A. Skeel. Jr .. Address. Is Ballknlplcy {lie Answer (0[" Troubled Cities and 
States? 50 1-1J II . L REI _ 1063 (20 13). 
175 See Jack M. Beennann. I1Je Public Pell.~io/J Cr;.~i.~. 70 WI S I . &. L1 [ L. RE , . 3. 82- 83 (2013). 
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compensation under the Tucker Act? This would make no sense at all. 
Many of the pensioners have no olher means of support, not even Social 
Security (Detroit, for example, had opted out of the Social Security 
system .. ). Moreover, if the pensioners' claims are trealed as unsecured 
debts, other unsecured creditors will take less of a haircut than if the 
pension claims are treated as effectively secured. Once the bankruptcy is 
over, it will be impossible to fe-scramble the various recoveries that have 
been allowed to different creditors based on the assumed status of the 
pension claims. Remitting the pensioners to a Tucker Act claim would 
also leave federal taxpayers on the hook fo r many years for a potentially 
huge liability that ordinarily would be borne by creditors. 
It would seem to be far better to reach a legal determination of the 
status of public pension obligations as constitutional property in the 
bankruptcy court, subject to interlocutory appeal to the district court and 
the relevant federal court of appeals (or even the Supreme Court). Such a 
clarification would allow the legal consequences of such a restructuring to 
be determined and factored into the final confirmation of a plan of 
reorganization by the bankruptcy court. The ruling could take the form of 
either a determination of the status of pension obligations under the 
Takings Clause, or an interpretation of the status of the pensions under 
bankruptcy law influenced by the desirability of avoiding a possible 
takings issue. " 
A second emerging controversy concerns proposals, under 
consideration in a number of California cities and elsewhere, to use the 
power of eminent domain to condemn so-called " underwater~ home 
mortgages . " The idea is to reduce monthly payments for the owners of 
such homes and revitalize local communities suffering from large numbers 
of foreclosed homes, by using the power of eminent domain to restructure 
underwater mortgages. The local government would condemn the 
mortgages, pay the mortgagees compensation based on the current market 
value of the homes, and then issue new mortgages consistent with current 
(lower) home values. The homeowners would remain in possession of the 
homes, and would end up with new loans and mortgages requiring lower 
monthly payments, making it more likely that they would be able to avoid 
foreclosure. 
The proposal is intrigu ing to many municipal politicians and housing 
176 David A. Sk<.-el. Jr .. eM PeflSiollS Be ReSlfllcwred in (Delroit~) Municipal &l1Ikn.lpfCy? 25 
(Univ. Pa. Law Sell. Faculty Scholarship Paper No. 508. 2013). h r r II : II s c h o i a r s hip. 1 a w . U ]I 
e n 1\ e d U 
Ifacul ry ~hoJarshi p/508 [http://perrm .cc!AR8Q-QZN6[ . 
177 TIle Courl. on review of a decision ari sing frolll the bankruptcy court . has interpreted the 
Bankruprcy Code so as 10 avoid a rakings is.~ue. S"'C Unired Srares v. Sec. Indl1~. Bank. 459 U.s. 70. 82 
(1982). 
178 See Roben C. Hockett . II Takes a Vi/lage: Municipa/ Condemnation Proceedings and 
PublidPrivate Parlllersbips (or MorfS8se Loan Modificalion. Value Preservalion. and Local teonomic 
&'COI·/HY. 18 51 I' . J-L. & s . & Fr i . 12 1 (201 2): Katharine RoHer. Notc. 1],1' COJJslilUliOlJ"lity o( 
Using EmincJlI Domain 10 COIu/emn U,u/e,wa/tJr Mortgagc Loam. 1121\·1]( i. L. RE \ . 139 (201 3). 
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advocates, who argue that because most mortgages issued in recent years 
have been securitized, the massively fragmented ownership and resulting 
high transaction costs preclude voluntary negotiation. ' Banks and other 
mortgage lenders vociferously oppose the idea, arguing that the use of 
eminent domain to restructure mortgage loans will undermine confidence 
in the mortgage market for years to come. " They argue that the proposed 
schemes violate both the public use and just compensation requirements of 
the Takings Clause. " 
Here we see an example of a controversy involving the exercise of 
eminent domain, as opposed to regulatory takings, where an anticipatory 
ruling on the takings issues would seem to be desirable. Given the great 
uncertainty about whether the proposals are constitutional, cities will be 
reluctant to adopt them, and investors will be reluctant to put up money for 
them. Meanwhile, the very existence of these schemes may exacerbate the 
uncertainty of banks and mortgage lenders about reentering particular 
mortgage markets. An anticipatory ruling on the constitutional questions, 
including perhaps an interpretation of the applicable principles of just 
compensation designed to avo id constitutional pitfalls, " would seem to be 
the only realistic means of overcoming the manifold uncertainties 
presented by such schemes. 
A third controversy grows out of a recommendation by the U.S. 
Copyright Office to amend the federal Copyright Act to extend federal 
copyright protection to sound recordings made before 1972. ' Currently, 
pre-1 972 sound recordings (including some of your favorite Beatles 
records) are protected only by state law. Creating federal copyright 
protection and preempting these state laws would afford these recordings 
more secure protection and more effective remedies. But it would also, in 
some cases, reduce the length of the term of protection relative to what is 
currently provided under state law. " 
Is enhancing protection for a form of intellectual property, while 
shortening the term, a taking? Owners of pre-1 972 recordings would 
179 See Hockett. supra nOle 178. ~t 13/!- 19. 
180 See Memorandum from W~lter Dellinger et at.. O'Meiveny & Myep.> LU'. 10 &'Cs. Indus. & Fin. 
Mkts. Assoc. 5 Uuly 16. 20 12). 1111 p : lf www.SiFllla.org / upl oadc df i l cs / i ssucs/c a 
plral markers 
Isecuriri za lion!erninenr_domainimenlOrandumfromo 
%2 7 me I ven yrnyerst os i f maresanhefTI~rd i n oem inenrdorlla inpwllOSil107l612. pd f I hit p: I I perma .cclC 11'Q· 
2E3QI. 
181 fd. at2.3-8. 
182 Mea.~urlngjl1~1 compensallnn in the condenll~1rion of undel'.vater mortgages rhM are nevertheles.~ 
still performing would confront a difficult conceptual issue: namely. sho uld the value of the condeliUled 
mortgages he based Oil the v~lue of the SL'Curity. that is. the CUITem fair market value of the homes. or 
should it he basl>d on the present value of the futu re stream of payments on the debt? Because of the 
collapse in housing prices, rhe value of rhe securlry L~ relarively low. Bur if rhe ho meowner i~ srill 
ma king paymenrs on rhe mortgage. rhe present value of rhe furure srream of payments may generare a 
higher numlJer. 
183 See Eva E. Suootnik & June M. Besek. ConSfillllionai Obslacles? Recollsidering Copyriglll 
Pro/eClioll for Pre·1972 SOImd Rt'COrdillgs. 37 a 10 M. J.L. & Ai T S 327 (201 4). 
181 See it!. at 329- 33. 
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surely like to know the answer to this question. It would have a 
significant bearing, for example. on what Lhey could obtain fo r transferring 
or licensing the rights to such recordings. If they are fo rced to wait until 
the federal term of protection ends, fo llowed by a suit in the CFe for just 
compensation, the world will have moved on. The identities of the holder 
of the rights and of the licensees may have changed, as well as the market 
value of the relevant rights. It would be difficull if nOI impossible to 
distribute any just compensation to all parties who may have entered into 
transactions over the rights during the interim. Moreover, it seems odd to 
stick future federal taxpayers wilh the burden of compensating for the 
value of state rights extinguished prospectively by a federal law enacted 
many years earlier. It would seem fa r better to allow rights holders to 
bring an action for an anticipatory ruling about the possibility of a Takings 
Clause violation shortly after the copyright amendment is enacted . This 
would clarify the package of rights associated with any license or 
conveyance of pre-1972 recordings, and, as in the two previous examples , 
might allow the court to interpret the new law in such a way as to 
eliminate or minimize any takings problem. 
C. Generalizing the Normative Case 
The foregOing examples suggest a variety of general reasons why 
antici patory remedies for ta kings would be adva ntageous. 
Fi rst, allowing takings cla ims to be resolved by declaratory judgment 
o r other anticipatory adj ud ication ca n eliminate unnecessary litiga tion and 
delay in resolving rights. Requiring the parties to litigate in the 
compensation court when that would be fu tile is a deadweight loss. 
Req uiring two lawsuits when one will resolve the controversy is a waste. 
Ironically. savings in litigation costs would be greatest when the ta kings 
claim is rejected by the court considering antici patory relief. The Supreme 
Court in Srop rhe Beach eliminated a potentially inefficient allocation of 
Iitiga tional resources by rej ecting the ta kings claim in that case. " Yet even 
if the court conSidering antici patory relief accepts the takings claim. it 
could result in litigation cost savings. The judgment could lead to a 
negotiated solution between the government and the property owner in 
many cases. And even if the owner ends up filing a cla im fo r 
compensation with the compensation court. in most cases that involve only 
the amount of compensation. a settlement is reached without formal 
litiga tion. ' 
Second . allowing antici patory adjudication can reduce uncertainty 
185 See~·uprapl). lij 55-57. 
186 See Yun·chl!'!] Chang. An Empirical Siudy of Cow1-A(fjudic,1/('(/ Takings Compcmmioll ill Ncw 
York C;1y: 19.90-2003.8]. EIl/ 11111 1 11 ,11 Sl I D. 384. 389 (201 I} (fi nding In a 12-year l'e liod in 
New York City only 27 adj udicated cases as opposed to 430 seUlernents): see also Cunis J. Berger & 
Patrick J. Rohan. 711e Nassau Coullly 5lUdy: An tillpirica/ Look i/JIo lire Practices of Condelllllalioll. 67 
Co I I i . L R, \ . 430. 440 (1967) (reporting in an carlier study thai over 85% of emincnl domain cases 
sculed). 
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about property rights. In theory, since the only question in takings cases is 
whether the property owner is entitled to compensation, and if so in what 
amount, the uncertainty presented by takings questions could be handled 
by "discounting" the prospective payment by some subjective risk factor. ' 
But the reality is not so simple. Whether the government is obligated to 
pay compensation will affect how various interested parties value their 
rights , and uncertainty about compensation can stymie efforts to rearrange 
rights. Thus, the government may not be willing to commit to what sort of 
exactions it requires for development of land until it knows the answer to 
the compensation question . And the developer may not want to move 
forward until the government is prepared to commit. " Moreover. as we 
see in the examples of municipal bankruptcy and the proposed 
condemnation of underwater mortgages, the way in which the takings 
question is resolved can have a decisive effect on how a reorganization is 
structured or whether a program to condemn underwater mortgages even 
moves forward at all. 
Third, allowing anticipatory adjudication would tend to level the 
playing field between property owners and government regulators. The 
argument here does not rest on speculation about the respective 
preferences of federal and state judges, with the assumption that federal 
judges are more sympathetic to property owners than state judges. Some 
property rights advocates argue this way, " but any such claim is 
contingent on the composition of the fede ral and state courts at any given 
point in time. and in any event it is not clear that it is true. A better 
argument is that govemment regulators have a built-in advantage because 
the costs of defending takings claims are paid by the taxpayers, whereas 
property owners must pay their legal fees out of their own pockets. This 
advantage allows government regulators and their lawyers to engage in a 
war of attrition, proposing multiple rounds of plan revisions and then 
engaging in multiple rounds of motions in court, with the result that 
property owners often relent rather than persist in pressing takings 
challenges to government regulations. Opening the doors to anticipatory 
relief could push the conflict toward a quicker resolution in some cases, 
which would offset this litigation advantage. 
Against these advantages it must be acknowledged that there are 
significant disadvantages to allowing anticipatory relief for takings. 
Accordingly, there should be limitations on its availability. Because the 
only substantive right created by the Takings Clause is the right of just 
compensation, there should be a strong presumption in the ordinary case 
187 See Bray. supra note 117. at 1303- 06, 
188 See id. at 1298 ("[I] t is h~rd ror peo ple to act and plan when they do not kllOw rhe precise lega l 
conSCfluences of their aCTions. "). 
189 Sec. '),g .. Michael M. Berger. Silence al Ille Courl: 771C Curious Absencc of R,ftulmory '[;1king.~ 
Cases IiV/1I C1lifomia Suprellle COUI'I jurisprudence. 26 U 1 . L.A L. Hi \ . 1133. 11 40 (1993). 
190 See Gregory M. Stein. Regulatory Takings and Ripeness in Ihe Federal COUriS. 18 VI I I . L. R! \ . 
1. 43 (1995) ("P raclicany speaking. lhe universe or lJiainliffs wilh lhe financial ability 10 survive lhe 
lengthy ripening process is smaiL "). 
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that an action in the compensation court is a fully adequate remedy for a 
laking. n lis is especially true if the issues in dispute are factual. " The 
compensation court - whether it be the CFe or a stale court of 
appropriate jurisdiction - can presumably resolve the factual questions as 
well as can any federal court asked to render a declaratory judgment or 
other anticipatory relief. This suggests that anticipatory relief should be 
reserved primarily for controversies that invo lve some novel and 
controlling issue of law. Just as certification of interlocutory appeals in 
federal court requires that the issue be "a controlling question of law" the 
resolution of which "may materially advance the ultimate termination of 
the litigation, " " anticipatory adjudication in takings cases will be 
appropriate primarily in cases where there are one or more discrete and 
controlling legal issues, such as whether the taking is for a public use, 
whether the interest of the claimant is "property," or whether particular 
categorical rules of liability or nonliability apply. 
Because the ultimate relief in a takings case can only be awarded by a 
compensation court, allowing anticipatory relief will also present the risk 
of multiplying lawsuits. If the property owner prevails in the anticipatory 
action, it may be necessary to file a second action in the compensation 
court to secure an award of compensation. As we have seen , this is not 
ineVitably the case. Anticipatory adjudication can eliminate futile or 
duplicative litigation. But if it is used indiscriminately, it could mean two 
lawsuits in many circumstances where there would otherwise be only one, 
which would increase rather than reduce the expenditure of social 
resources on takings litigation. 
v. SO~[ G UID!I IS I5 f Oi A IJICl f AJO iY ADJ llDIC AJI O~ 
Anticipatory relief is disc retionary, but this does not mean that district 
courts should exercise raw intuition in deciding whether to grant such 
reli ef. It would be helpful to have a general set of princip les, and ideally a 
body of precedents. to draw upon that would shape the judicial exercise of 
discretion in determining whether to grant anticipatory remedies for 
takings. My suggestion is that courts look to the law of equity for 
guidance in resolving applications for anticipatory relief. 
The principles of equity are not directly applicable to most forms of 
what J have called antici patory adjudication . Although "born under 
equitable auspices and having preponderantly equitable affiliations , H 
dec laratory judgments in federal courts are the product of a statutory 
reform - the Declaratory Judgment Act. Thus for historical reasons 
courts have not regarded the declaratory j udgment as part of the system of 
equity. " Similarly. judicial review of agency action is determined by 
191 .'iCe Bray . . ~upm rKlte 117. at 1330 (arguing t/~11 legal indetennlnacy i~ more likely to Justify 
"preventive" adj udication than factual inderermiIlilCY). 
192 28 U.s.c. § 1292(11) (20 12). 
193 r:.lli l i BU(IItD .D1Clll)l ot ! l aD.UITS 348 {ld ed. 1941}. 
194 TIle geneml undersTarKling L~ ThaT actions for dec/amTory judgmenTS are cha racTerized as elTher 
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statute today, yet it has origins in equity. ' And the Supreme Court's 
discretionary exercise of the certiorari power is certainly not regarded as a 
type of equity. Nevertheless, each of these anticipatory regimes shares 
with equity the central feature of great discretion and the need to develop a 
set of principles or gUidelines to structure the exercise of that discretion so 
as to make it socially usefu l. Equity, as the discretionary system that has 
been around the longest. has devoted the most sustained thought to 
developing solutions to this problem. It is lherefore not surprising that in 
its "flexibility and adaptability" the declaratory judgment has "imported 
many features from equity." 
Lawyers who are not familiar with equity often regard it as being 
centered on a simple four-part test. ' More accurately considered. equity 
consists of a highly articulated system. .. That system consists of a series 
of distinct remedial devices, li ke the inj unction, restitution, and the 
constructive trust. But it has also developed a set of conditions that 
determine whether equitable relief is appropriate, such as good faith and 
lack of notice, and a set of defenses that can be invoked to defeat the 
intervention of equity, including unclean hands, laches, and estoppel. · 
Perhaps most importantly, because it has been around for centuries, equity 
has generated a very large body of precedent , which can provide gUidance 
on many of the issues likely to arise in determining whether anticipatory 
remedies for takings are appropriate. For example, equity has determined 
that one ground supporting discretionary intervention is to forestall a 
multiplicity of suits'" - one of the reasons developed in the last Part as a 
j ustification fo r anticipatory relief. 
Another reason why equity provides a good benchmark is that the 
central problem that has concerned courts of equity for hundreds of years 
is directly analogous to the problem that would face any court asked to 
provide anticipatory relief in a takings case. The central question in equity 
is whether the remedy "at law," which is ordinarily money damages, is for 
one reason or another inadequate, such that a different form of relief. such 
as an injunction, is warranted. The problem that wou ld confront a judge 
asked to award declaratory or other anticipatory relief in a takings 
lega l or C(llIilable uepenuing on the naillre of Ihe anlicipalct1 aClioll Ihal the ucclaralory action is 
designct1 10 resolve. Sm Beacon Theatres. [nco v. Westover. 359 U.S. SOIl 504. 507- 08 (1959); id. M 
515 (Stewart. J.. uisscnting). 
195 See Thomas W. Merrill. Article III. Agency Arfjudica/iol!. and llie Origins ofllie Appellale Review 
Model ofAd/JIi"i~·trHli<'e Law. III Co 1 ~ M . L Ri \ .939.952- 53. 963- 95 (201 1). 
196 130 1 (1\ID .~·upra nOl eI93.aI 178. 
197 See Mark P. Gergen et al.. 17m Supreme COUTY $ Accidenl.11 Re<-olurion? 11m Tesl [or PNJllflIJCllI 
iJYunCliolls. 112 CI LIM . L. RE I . 203. 218- 19 (2012) {criticizing lower courts for reading eHay Inc. Y. 
MercExchallge. LLC.. 517 U.s. 388 (2006). as endoP.>illg a ulliversa[ four-part tesl for equitable relief 
~rld ignoring lraditional principles o f equity}. 
198 See Samuel L. Bray. TlJC Syslem of Equilable Remcdie.~ 20 {Columbia Law Sell. Legal Theory 
Work..~holl Paper. Sept. 19. 20 14}. 
199 Seegenerally Dl I B. ])) 11$ . LII 01 RE M! I IEI 66- 85 (WesI2ded. 1M3). 
200 See Doug[as Laycock. 'Ihe iJearh or Ihe Irreparable byU/y Rule. 103 HIl i . L. RI \ . 687. 711 
{1990} {citing dcc isiOrlS holding Ihat "[~[ legal remedy is inadeqllale if II would f'CIluirc a ' rlIulliplicity 
ofsuhs·"J. 
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controversy is closely related: whether the remedy provided by the 
compensation court, money damages, is for one reason or another 
inadequate, such that anticipatory relief is warranted. Although eminent 
domain is nOl an action "at law~ in the constitutional sense (for example, 
the Court has held that condemnation cases are not actions at law for 
purposes of the right to trial by j UlY), the point of the general threshold 
condition for equitable relief is lhal such relief should be allowed if an 
action for money damages will provide inadequate relief. The learning 
accumulated by courts of equity in answering this question can directly 
inform the exercise of discretion in determining whether to grant anticipatory 
relief in a takings case. 
The requirement that the remedy at law be inadequate is often 
expressed in terms of whether the claimant will suffer "irreparable harm, ~ 
meaning the claimant will suffer harm that cannot be rectified by an award 
o f damages.'" Thus, for example, courts will generally decline to enjoin a 
breach of contract fo r the delivery of fungib le goods, because the ordinary 
remedy for breach of such a contract - an award of damages - is fully 
adequate in this context.. The party who suffers such a breach can use the 
money damages to acquire equivalent goods in the market, leaving that 
party whole. 
The logic of limiting a party who suffers a government taking to an 
action for money compensation is, if anything, even more powerful than 
the argument for limiting relief to money damages in cases of breach of 
contract. In contract, the substantive right is the right to have the contract 
performed as promised. Depending on the subject matter of the contract, 
an award of damages mayor may not provide adequate relief for the 
breach. It is well established, for example, that contracts fo r the sale of 
real estate or unique personal property are subject to specific performance, 
a form of equitable relief, because such goods cannot be replaced by 
purchasing equivalent goods in the market. '" In the case of takings of 
property (assuming the public use requirement and other lega l prerequisites 
are met) , the only substantive right is the right to payment of j ust 
compens ation. In the ordinary case, therefore. there is a s trong reason to 
presume that the remedy of compensation will provide adequate relief. 
Whether or not there should be a presumption against equitable relief in 
other contexts,." insofar as takings claims are concerned it is entirely 
20 1 Un iled Slates v. Reynolds, 397 U.s. 14, 18 (1970): Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.s. 548, 593 (1897) . 
In contrast the Court has held rlLat regu latory takings claims brought under 42 US.c. § 1983 arc 
aClions ar law for Sevenrh Amendmetll purposes. City of Monlercy v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, 
ltd .. 526 U.S. 687. 709 (1999). 
202 See Gergen et al.. supra note 197, at 209 (noting Ih~t irreparable iuju ry and inadequacy of leg~1 
remedies 'are. tradi tionally speaking. one and the same"): Laycock, supra note 200, at 694 ("TIle two 
formulations are equivalent ... : J. 
203 See, e.g, Greal' W. Ufe II.!. Annuity hl~. Co. v. Knudson. 534 U.s. 204. 210 (2002). 
204 Uiycock. supra //Ole 200, at 703- 07 , 
205 Professor Douglas Laycock argues pe~uasiveJy that the presulIlption against L'(luit~b le relief 
tdleeted in the usual fonnu lation of "irrellilrable harm' docs not fairly rel)rCSCll t the actual practice of 
courts. ld. at 700- 01. In his view. "legal remedies are inadequate unless they are as complete, 
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appropriate to start with a presumption in favor of compensation being an 
adeq uate remedy, which is to say, a presumption against anticipatory relief. 
In garden-variety eminent domain actions, for example, there is no 
reason to consider anticipatory relief. The condemnation action will itself 
yield a judgment awarding "just compensation" to the owner, and this is 
the full extent of the relief to which the owner is entitled under the 
Constitution.·" Compensation is "just~ if it is based on the "fair market 
value" of the property taken.'" Paymelll itself can be delayed if interest is 
given to compensate for any delay between the time of the taking and the 
time of payment.·" "All that is required is the existence of a 'reasonable, 
certain and adequate provision for obtaining compensation ' at the time of 
the taking. ~ r" Deviations from these principles can ordinarily be rectified 
on direct appeal. 
Nevertheless , just as the proposition that equity will not illlercede to 
prevent a breach of contract is subject to exceptions where specific 
performance is warranted, there are also, as we have seen, exceptions 
where anticipatory relief is warrallled under the Takings Clause. Even in 
condemnation cases, equitable relief in a federal court of general jurisdiction 
is warranted if the condemnation is not for a public use or is not authorized 
by law. " If the government seeks to take an owner's property in return for 
an award of compensation, but has no constitutional or legal authOrity to do 
so , then the owner will have been deprived of a unique asset without 
justification, and has necessarily suffered irreparable harm. Equity should 
intervene in these circumstances.' 
Regulatory ta kings cases present more serious candidates for 
anticipatory illlervelllion than do eminent domain cases. These are 
situations in which an owner claims her property has been taken, but the 
government denies any obligation to compensate. For example, the 
government may ban development of land in order to preserve a wetland 
or habitat, and may argue that such a ban may be imposed without 
prclctic~1. ~nd efficient as equitable remedies. " {d. at 766. 
206 See4S\CIWl j,5upr3 nole95.§ 12.02111. 
207 United States v. Miller. 311 U.s. 369. 374 (1943) (fluot ing United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Co .. 
229 U.S. 53, 81 (1913)};.we 4 S( ( ( M II. supra note 95. § 12.021 11. 
208 See Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. United States. 261 U.S. 299. 306 (1923) , 
209 Preseault v.ICC. 494 U.s , I , 11 (i990) (quoting Reg 'l Rail Rang. Act Cases. 419 U.s. 102. 125 
(1974)}. 
210 Set! Haw. 1·lous. Auth. v. Midkiff. 467 U.s. 229. 24 1 (19M) (injunct ion proper For taking without 
puhllc use); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer. 343 U.S. 579. 585 (1952) (l,!jUnCl!on proper 
when propeny has been · unlawfully taken"). 
211 One could argue that l'tlu itable itttervention for an unauthoriled taking should be grounded in the 
Due Process Clause rather th;m the Takings Clause. X'f! D. Zachary Hudson. Note. Emillt!1I1 Do",ai" 
Due Process. 119 Y, l E LJ. 1280 (201U). But at lea~t rhelorlcally. the puhlic use requirement 1~1s heen 
situated In the Takings CL1use rather [han being regarded as an element of due process. 5<'f!. e.g .. 
Brown v. Legal Found. of WiI.'ih .. 538 U ,5. Z 16. Z31 - 32 (Z(]()3) ("While it confi rms [he S[a te' s au thority 
10 confiscate private property, the text of [he FiIl!t Amendment imposes two conditions on [he exercise 
of such authOrity: the taking must be For a 'public use' and 'just COUl!)Cnsation ' lIlust he paid to the 
owner:). 
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compensation under the police power." Or the government may deny that 
the interest asserted is "property~ within the meaning of the Takings 
C1ause.- Or the government may argue lhal a categorical rule of 
nonliability, such as the navigation servitude, applies.'" 
When the government engages in action lhal the owner regards as a 
taking, but denies any obligation La compensate, the owner is put in a 
much more disadvantaged position relative to an owner who is subj ect to a 
formal eminent domain proceeding. Any taking, whether compensated or 
not, may be disruptive, even wrenching, to the owner' s plans. But. with a 
formal eminent domain proceeding, at least an award of money is 
guaranteed to be forthcoming, adjusted if need be by interest to account for 
any delay. The owner can use the compensation to begin rebuilding her 
life or business. A person who suffers a taking for which the government 
denies responsibility, in cOlllrast, is much worse off. Here, much or all of 
the economic value of the property is gone and there is no guarantee than 
any money equivalent will be forthcoming, certainly not at any time in the 
foreseeable fu ture. If and when the compensation materializes, the owner 
quite likely will have experienced a change in circumstances that cannot be 
undone. The prolonged period of deprivation of the property , combined 
with the great uncertainty about whether any compensation will ever be 
paid, can fairly be described as a form of injury that goes beyond that 
which accompanies an exercise of eminent domain., 
Still, it wou ld not be correct to characterize every regulatory takings 
case as entailing irreparable inj ury of the sort that would justify 
anticipatory relief. Consider in this regard a typical regulatory takings 
claim governed by the ad hoc standard of Penn Central Transportation 
Co. v. New York City., I In such a case, whether the government has 
committed a taking will be determined only after gathering facts about the 
nature and circumstances of the government action and weighing multiple 
factors that the courts have identified as being relevant to reaching a 
judgmelll about takings liability.. The compensation court is probably as 
well equipped to find the facLS and do the balancing as is any other court.' '' 
212 See. e.g .. I'alaaolo v. Rhode ls lalld. S33 US. 606, 611 (2oo!) . 
213 See. e.g .. PhillillS v. Wash. Legal Found .. 524 US. 156. 160 (\998). 
214 See. e,g.. Unlled States v. Cherokee NaHan. 480 U.S. 7oo. 70 1- 02 (1987). For a dL<;cu..~sjon of 
categorical mles of non Habil ity. see 0 \ I 1 & M E I I Ill . supra n()(e 40, at 11 0- 20. 
21S See Laycock. Sflpm note 200, at 711 (-\k'Spite the Court' s claim to the colltrary. the injury from 
Financial distress is o rt en irreparable."). 
216 438 U.S. 104. 124 (1 978). Another example of an ad hoc s tandard is the fair return standard for 
public utmty ratenlilking. See. e.g., Duquesne Ught Co. v. Barasch. 488 U.S. 299, 308- 10 (1989) : ,w.e 
also 0 1 I I &lvlE l llll ,supranote 40,at 164- 68. 
217 See Penn Cell/ra!. 4311 U.S. at 124. 
218 A caveat is appropriate here givclllhat Ihe CFC is an -Article l" court . ralher than an Article 111 
court . and the Federal Circuit reviews factual determinations by the CFC under a highly deferential 
clear error standard. Sec. e.g., A rk. Game II.! Fish Comm 'n v. United States, 637 F.3d 1366, 1374 (Fed . 
Cir. 2011), rev'd 011 oliler grou/lds, 133 S. Ct. 51 1 (20 12). II has been he ld in other contexts that 
critical facts thm bear on the proK'ction of constilUt ional rights must be considered independent ly by an 
Article II! court . Y't' Crowdl v. Benson, 285 US. 22. 60- 61 (1 922): Henry P. Monaghan. 
Con~lilulio/Jal FaCI Revicv.'. 85 ('--G [ I i . L R.i \ . 229. 253- 56. 276 (1985). Wllether the Federa! 
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Indeed, since only the compensation court is empowered to enter 
j udgments providing the payment of compensation, the case will be 
resolved more quickly by requiring that all issues be resolved in a single 
proceeding before the compensation courl. The regulatory takings 
claimant may suffer more than the owner subject to eminent domain due to 
the delay and uncertainty , but a court of general jurisdiction can do nothing 
in a routine Penn Central-type case to alleviate that hardship, and hence 
should generally stay its hand. 
Yet even in cases governed by the Penn Central standard, it would not 
be appropriate to invoke any categorical rule against anticipatory 
intervention. Penn Central includes many ill-defined elements, and lower 
courts have made some headway in attempting to bring greater clarity and 
coherence to aspects of the standard. '" If a case arose in which a critical 
issue was preseIlled about the correct interpretation of one of the Penn 
Central factors, this too cou ld be the type of occasion in which declaratory 
relief would be warranted . 
The foregoing considerations suggest that anticipatory relief will 
ordinarily be appropriate only when some contro lling question of law is 
presented, the resolution of which will prevent more injury to the owner or 
the legal system than will be the case if the resolution is postponed until 
the compensation court renders a final judgmenl. It would be a mistake. 
however, to adopt a strict rule to the effect that only coIllrolling questions 
of law may be considered in takings cases 
by a court of equ ity. The history of equity suggests that intervention may 
be appropriate to prevent a variety of injustices. It is impossible, in the 
nature of things , to catalog in advance all of the circumstances in which 
anticipatory relief would be warranted. 
CO.IClUS10S 
Given that virtual ly all eminent domain cases and most regulatory 
tak ings cases can and shou ld be reso lved by compensation courts, a critic 
might wonder if anticipatory intervention shou ld be limited to the Supreme 
Court. After all, the Court, by its own reckoning. is a specia lized tribunal, 
one of whose prime purposes is to reso lve important questi ons of federal 
law that "halvel not been, but should be, sett led."'" Perhaps this requ ires 
that the Court be given fl exibility about when to pick out takings cases 
from the pool of litigation bubbling up below, which means giving it 
discretion to ignore general rules that bind inferior tribunals. Allowing 
inferior tri bunals to disregard the requ irement of channe ling all takings 
cases to compensation courts, in contrast , might generate too much takings 
litigation. excessive involvement of federal courts in the essentially local 
CIrcui t's fact review in takings cases comports with such a requ irement l~ an untested question. 
219 See TIlOmas W. Merri ll. Tire Character of Ore GOl'el1!11relllai Actio/!. 36 VI . L. Hi \ . 649. 661 - 71 
(ZOIZ) {describing e!Tons in lower courts to particularize the meaning of one of the Pellll Celllral 
factors}. 
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process of land use regulation, or other forms of mischief. 
If anything, I think the reverse is true. The Supreme Court has shown 
that it is not restricted by the general rule, reflected in the A line cases, 
requiring adjudication of takings claims by compensation courts. The 
Court enforces the A line when it deems it important to reinforce the rule. 
But when it perceives a need to resolve a takings issue thal has not been 
processed by a compensation court, it simply follows the B line. which is 
to decide the issue without adverting to the supposed rule. By having both 
the A line and the B line. the Court already has what amounts to large 
discretion, manifested in a paltern of alternating between following the 
rule and ignoring the rule. This is not especially edify ing as a model of 
jurisprudence, but it does not impose great costs on the Court itself in 
terms of its ability to exercise supervisory authority over the development 
of takings law. 
The actors who suffer most from the existence of two lines of authority 
about litigating takings claims are the lower courts and the lawyers who 
appear before them. Especially where novel takings claims arise in courts 
of general j urisdiction, any attempt to secure legal resolution of the claim 
is likely to be met by an aggressive invocation of the A line by government 
attorneys. Opposing counsel will struggle to find an adequate response to 
these authorities , since the many Supreme Court decisions that dispense 
with the A line lack any kind of doctrinal foundation. The result is that 
both lawyers and courts are left to struggle with articu lating reasons for 
permitting the takings claim to be litigated by a court of general 
jurisdiction, or at least permitting controlling issues to be resolved, when 
their intuition tells them this is the sensible thing to do. All this confUSion 
leads to extra legal research, extra rounds of briefing, and a roulette wheel 
of decisions either dismissing or not dismissing claims on the basis of A 
line precedents. 
What is needed is better gUidance from the Supreme Court. I suggest 
the adoption of three simple principles: (I) the Takings Clause is violated 
only by denying compensation for otherwise permissible takings; (2) 
awards of compensation must be made by the deSignated compensation 
court; (3) courts of general jurisdiction may enter declaratory or other 
forms of anticipatory relief about an owner' s eligibility for compensation 
when requiring the owner to litigate the claim in a compensation court 
would violate principles of equity. 
Anticipatory relief. whether in the form of a declaratory judgmeIII or 
otherwise, should not be available as a matter of course. Given the nature 
of the right, in most cases courts should refrain from issuing declaratory 
judgments, and should direct the claimant to bring an action in the court 
that has authority to award money compensation. But there are 
circumstances, perhaps increasing in frequency over time as governments 
march into uncharted territories, where remitting property owners to 
actions in the compensation courts will result in incomplete, impractical, or 
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inefficient outcomes.'" In such cases, anticipatory relief should be both 
permissible and appropriate. Recognizing that anticipatory relief is 
available in circumstances where the general conditions fo r equitable relief 
are satisfied, as long as such relief respects the limited nature of the right 
created by the Takings Clause and does not usurp the limited waiver of 
sovereign immunity for actions to recover compensation from the 
government, wou ld go fa r to clear up the highly confusing state of the law 
regarding remedies for takings, and wou ld lay the foundation fo r more 
consistent and effective enforcement of this consti tutional right. 
221 Cr. Laycock. supra nore 200. ar 768. 
